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'Thou Shalt Not Put a Stumbling
Block Before the Blind": The
Americans with Disabilities Act and
Public Transit for the Disabled
by
MICHAEL LEwYN*

The Bible states: "Thou shalt not.., put a stumbling block
before the blind."' Yet American governments at all levels have
done exactly that, by making jobs and other opportunities unavailable
to the 24 million2 disabled Americans dependent on public transit,
including 1.1 million blind Americans, 3 and some of the 3.2 million

* Associate Professor, John Marshall Law School. Formerly a law clerk to Judges
Morris Arnold (W.D. Ark., more recently 8th Cir.) and Theodore McMillian (8th Cir.)
and Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Miami School of Law. I would like to
thank Adam Milani, Jeffrey Van Detta, and David Oedel for their helpful comments.
Any errors of fact or logic, of course, are mine alone.
1. Leviticus 19:14.
2. According to the Federal Transit Administration, 24 million disabled Americans
are dependent on public transit. See William W. Millar, Testimony of the American Public
TransitAssociation Before the Labor, Health & Human Servs., Educ. & Related Agencies
Subcomm. of the House Appropriations Comm., Feb. 5, 1998, available at 1998 WL
8991781. Disabled Americans are by no means the only transit-dependent Americans.
Most of the very poor cannot afford cars, 62 million Americans are too young to drive, and
5.4 million elderly Americans do not drive. See Anne Simmons, A Ride to Work-- TEA-21
and PRWDRA, 18 LAW & INEQ. 243, 260 (2000) (94% of welfare recipients do not own
automobiles); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1999 at 22 (119th ed. 1999) (62 million Americans
under age 16) (hereinafter 1999 ABSTRAC); Charles T. Dubin, American Association of
Retired Persons Public Policy Statements on the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, FED.
LAW., Mar./Apr. 1997, at 28, 29 (5.4 million seniors do not drive). Cf.Robert L. Mullen,
The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: An Introductionfor Lawyers and Judges,29 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 175, 180 (1994) (noting likely explosion of elderly population over next
few decades).
3. See Nancy Lawler Dickhute, Jury Duty for the Blind in a Time of Reasonable
Accommodations: The ADA's Interface with a Litigant's Right to a Fair Trial, 32
CREIGrTON L. REv. 849,881 n.4 (1999) (1.1 million Americans legally blind).
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Americans 4 who are severely visually impaired.5 Specifically, the
state and federal governments have, by building highways to suburbs
with minimal or nonexistent public transportation and through a
variety of other policies encouraging migration to suburbs,
redistributed jobs and other civic opportunities to those suburbs. 6 By
redistributing development to areas without effective public transit,
government has systematically excluded the blind and other transitdependent Americans from employment, shopping, and other
7
opportunities.
The federal government has sought to better the lot of the
disabled through the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),8 which,
inter alia, ordered local governments to make bus and train systems
more accessible to the disabled. 9 But in fact, the ADA has not met its
goal of "welcom[ing] individuals with disabilities fully into the
mainstream of American society."' 0
The ADA imposed costly requirements upon local public transit
systems but did not give local governments funds with which to satisfy
this mandate. 1 By reducing the funds available to transit systems, the
4. Id.
5. This figure is based on Millar's estimate that 24 million disabled Americans are
transit-dependent, supra note 2, and Dickhute's statement that just over 4 million
Americans are blind or severely visually impaired, see Dickhute, supra note 3, at 881 n.4.
6. See infra notes 86-102, 123-63 and accompanying text (describing government
policies that favored suburban growth).
7. See infra notes 24-54 and accompanying text (describing second-class status of
transit-dependent Americans).
8. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990)

(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12001-12213).
9. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (no disabled person may be excluded from public
services); 42 U.S.C. § 12142 (public transit systems may not purchase or lease a new bus
unless it is readily accessible to individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use
wheelchairs); 42 U.S.C. § 12143 (such agencies must provide on-demand "paratransit"
service to disabled persons unable to use traditional public transit). See generally Bonnie
P. Tucker, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: An Overview, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 923,
931-32 (briefly summarizing ADA provisions most relevant to public transit).
10. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. I (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267,268.
11. See Millar, supra note 2; Brigid Hynes-Cherin, Testimony of the American Public
Transit Association, Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transp. of the House Comm. on
Transp. & Infrastructure,Sept. 26, 1996, availableat 1996 WL 10831544 (pointing out that
the ADA "is being implemented at the same time that federal financial support is
declining" and explaining that "ADA costs to transit operators will exceed $1.4 billion
annually.., more than twice the $400 million annual amount of transit operating
assistance since FY 1996"); Brian Doherty, Disabilities Act Source of Unreasonable
Accommodations, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 16, 1995, at G1 ("The American Public
Transit Association claims $1.1 billion per year just for the paratransit provisions of the
ADA."). While the federal government was raising transit systems' costs, it was also
reducing grants to transit systems; as a result, ADA costs canceled out over 1/3 of federal
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12
ADA has sometimes forced cutbacks in transit service for everyone
(including, ironically, the disabled to the extent that disabled13 people

were able to use public transit before the ADA's enactment).
The ADA does not forbid such cutbacks, because it "does not
require public transit systems to provide better service to disabled
passengers than is provided to other passengers, only comparable
service."'1 4 In other words, the ADA does not require that disabled
transit users be made equal to the auto-using majority. Instead, that
statute requires merely that disabled transit users be made equal to
other transit-dependent Americans. It follows that if a state or local
government is not interested in aiding the transit-dependent disabled,
it can freeze the disabled out of the transportation system by slashing
service for all users of public transit' 5 -even if it increases spending
on highways and other driver-related services. 16 Thus, government
can and does make the transit-dependent disabled second-class
citizens by making all nondrivers second-class citizens.
grants to state and local transit systems during the late 1990s. See AMERICAN PUBLIC
TRANSIT ASSOCIATION, TRANSIT FACT BOOK 52 (1998) (federal support for transit
operating expenses decreased by over 40% between 1990 and 1996, and local support
decreased by over 20%); Hynes-Cherin, supra (ADA cost transit operators $1.4 billion per
year); 1999 ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 314 (federal government granted state and local
governments $3.9 billion for mass transit in fiscal year 1999, down from $4.3 billion in
fiscal year 1995).
12. See James Rana, Trying to Keep Transit's Head Above Water, PROVIDENCE J.BULL., Nov. 24,1996, at 11 (Providence, Rhode Island bus agency reduced service because
"like every other transit agency in the nation, [it] had been hurt by reductions in federal
operating assistance ....At the same time ...Uncle Sam is demanding cleaner-running
buses and more service to handicapped riders."); Jerry Crimmins, Pace Expands Van Pool,
Service to Disabled, CmI. TRIB., Nov. 18, 1996, at 1 (Chicago suburban bus company
reduced overall bus service in order to increase spending on special vans for disabled.);
Associated Press, Transit Cuts "Too Much"-So Say Local Officials Who'll Protest in
Washington, WIS. ST. J., Feb. 24, 1996, at 3B (Municipal transit officials urged federal
government to modify ADA because "federal mass transit cuts, costly regulations, and
unfunded mandates are forcing cities across Wisconsin to reduce service.").
13. For example, 35% of all buses were accessible to the disabled before the ADA was
enacted, and most visually impaired riders were able to use public transit before the
passage of the ADA. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. I, at 24; Jennifer Orsi, Bus System
Catches ProtestsFrom Blind Passengers,ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 18,1989, at 1 ("No
one depends on public transportation more than the blind" according to president of
Tampa Bay chapter of National Federation for the Blind.).
14. Midgett v. Tri-County Transp. Dist., 74 F. Supp. 2d 1008,1012 (D. Or. 1999).
15. See supra note 12 (describing nationwide mid-1990s cutbacks in transit service,
caused by ADA costs and reductions in federal aid to transit providers); Hassan v. Slater,
41 F. Supp. 2d 343,351 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 199 F.3d 1322 (2d Cir. 1999) (allowing closure of
commuter train station because, inter alia, "[ilt does not appear that the ADA requires the
MTA defendants to keep all of its stations open").
16. See 1999 ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 314 (highway spending increased between
fiscal years 1995 and 1999, while federal aid to transit decreased).
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Part I of this Article describes how federal, state and local
transportation policies (and to a lesser extent, a variety of other
public policies) disable the transit-dependent disabled. Part II
describes the evolution of black-letter law governing public transit for
the disabled: the first pre-ADA attempts to make public transit
accessible to the disabled, and then the ADA itself and case law
thereunder. Part III explains why the ADA is inadequate and
sometimes even counterproductive, and Part IV suggests a variety of
reforms to end government's exclusionary transportation policies.
I. How Big Brother Disables the Disabled
It has been suggested that employment and social opportunities
for the disabled have improved in recent decades' 7-and in some
respects this may be so. 18 But for most 19 of the 24 million transitdependent disabled Americans, 20 life has become harder as America
has become more auto-dependent. This Part explains how life has
become more difficult for transit-dependent Americans in recent
decades, and shows how government created this problem by driving
people and jobs away from transit hubs and into auto-dominated
suburbs.
A. Transit-Dependent Americans as Second-Class Citizens

Once upon a time, almost every metropolitan American could go
anywhere with streetcar fare and his or her feet; in the first decades of
the 20th century, developable urban real estate was typically within
walking distance of streetcar lines.2 ' Even today, one can comfortably
survive without a car in a few American cities. 22 But in some smaller

17. See Sharon Rennert, All Aboard: Accessible Public Transportationfor Disabled
Persons, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 360, 360 (1988) ("Over the past twenty years, society has
begun to confront and remove many of the physical and attitudinal barriers that have
segregated disabled people.").
18. Id. (To increase the mobility of the disabled, "our communities have begun to
adapt their landscapes by adding curb cuts, ramps, wider doorways, and braille signs.").
19. Excepting the 1.4 million persons so severely disabled that they are unable to use a
regular bus or rail system. Id. at 399.
20. See Millar, supranote-2 (24 million figure given).
21. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF

TiE UNITED STATES 189 (1985).
22. See Lowell Cohn, 'Stick Made Chilly FirstImpression, PRESS DEMOCRAT, June 7,
1999 ("You really don't need a car in New York City."); JAMES TAYLOR ET AL., CARFREE IN BOSTON:
ENGLAND (2000).

THE GUIDE To PUBLIC TRANSIT IN GREATER BOSTON AND NEW
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cities23 and in even more suburbs, auto ownership is virtually
mandatory for a normal life. 24 Because two-thirds of all new jobs are
now created in suburbs, many workers need a car just to get to
work.25 In fact, a survey by the U.S. Commerce Department shows
that only 54.4% of American households have any public transit at all
available to them, and that only 28.8% claim to have satisfactory
26
public transit.

Even in metropolitan areas with extensive transit systems, the
majority of entry-level jobs are not transit-accessible.2 7 For example,
the Boston region has a central city with a well-developed transit
system and a commuter train system that serves many of its suburbs. 28
But even in Greater Boston, just 32% of entry-level employers are
within one-quarter mile of transit, 43% are within one-half mile, and
58% are within one mile.29 Only 14% of entry-level jobs can be
reached by transit within an hour from Boston's poorer

23. See, e.g., infra notes 37-47 (describing virtually nonexistent public transit in Macon,
Ga.)
24. See Miller v. Anckaitis, 436 F.2d 115, 120 (3d Cir. 1970) ("For the urban poor, in
particular, remoteness from the thriving suburban segment of the industrial economy and
a deteriorating public transportation system often make use of an automobile the only
practical alternative to welfare."); People v. Coutard, 454 N.Y.S. 2d 639, 642 (Dist. Ct.
1982) ("In a suburban county such as ours, the use of an automobile by most of its citizens
is often as necessary as placing bread upon their tables."); Cent. Towers Co. v. Borough of
Fort Lee, 390 A.2d 677, 680 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1978) ("Automobiles are a necessity and not a
luxury in the suburbs where mass transit facilities are not as readily available to residents
as they are to city dwellers"); JOHN NORQUIST, THE WEALTH OF CITIES 172 (1998) ("As
in the rest of the advanced industrial world, driving a car in Canadian cities is a travel
choice, not a necessity. Only the U.S. government denies this choice to its citizens.");
Charles Belfoure, Neighborhood Profile: Woodlawn, BALT. SUN, Feb. 7, 1999, at 1M
("[Tlhe suburban sprawl that started after World War II forced Americans to go
everywhere by car.").
25. See Anne Gearan, Clinton to Loosen Car Restriction for Food Stamp Recipients,
CHARLESTON GAZETrE & DAILY MAIL, Feb. 24,2000, at P7A.
26. See Paul M. Weyrich & William S. Lind, Does Transit Work? A Conservative
Reappraisal, at http:llwww.apta.comlinfo/online/weyrich2new.htm (last visited July 7,
1999) (citing survey). These statistics may actually overestimate Americans' access to
public transit, because some Americans whose public transit is in some sense
"satisfactory" may not be able to use it to reach key destinations such as their jobs-for
example, "reverse commuters" who live in transit-friendly cities but work in autodependent suburbs.
27. See Gearan, supra note 25 ("[E]ven in metropolitan areas with extensive transit
systems, fewer than half the entry-level jobs are accessible by that means.").
28. See CONSERVATION LAW FOUNDATION, CITY ROUTES, CITY RIGHTS 20 (1998)
[hereinafter CITY ROUTES].
29. Id.
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neighborhoods. 30 Similarly, more than one-third of all entry-level
jobs in the Baltimore region cannot be reached at all by bus or train. 3
The situation is even worse in Sun Belt cities. For example,
Atlanta's second largest suburban county (Gwinnett County, which
had 522,000 people in 1998) has no public transportation
whatsoever, 32 and even some neighborhoods within the Atlanta city

limits have virtually no bus service.33 Not surprisingly, less than half
of Atlanta-area entry-level jobs are located within a quarter-mile of a
public transit route.34 And Atlantans know their public transit system
is unsatisfactory: a recent survey revealed that only 22% of metro
Atlantans regard their region's public transit system as good or
excellent-a percentage that nosedived to as low as 7% in some
35
counties.
And in smaller cities, a nondriver's life is more desperate still.
For example, in Macon, Georgia (a city of 114,000 people),36 16% of
city households 37 (and 14% of households in the county that includes
Macon) 38 lack cars, yet city buses only operate until 6:45 PM in the
evening on weekdays, Saturday service is limited, and there is no
service on Sundays or holidays.39
Because many entry-level

employers require their newest employees to work evening and
weekend shifts, this system virtually shuts many of Macon's carless
30. Id.
31. See Marcia Myers, Jobs out of Reach for the Carless, BALT. SUN, Nov. 16, 1999, at
10.
32. See Stacy Shelton, Transit Chief Faces Hurdles in Gwinnett, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Feb. 11, 2000, at C1 (noting that Gwinnett is nation's largest county without
public transit).
33. For example, my parents live within the city of Atlanta about 10 miles from
downtown Atlanta, but (except for a "maid bus" that comes from downtown once in the
morning and returns downtown in the afternoon), they have no bus service. See Michael
E. Lewyn, Are Spread out Cities Really Safer? (Or,Is Atlanta Safer Than New York?), 41
CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 279, 295 n.63 (1993); MARTA Web Site, at
http://www.itsmarta.com/ridingbusroutes/bus_sch.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2000) (listing
buses 701-17, a group of once-a-day "maid buses").
34. See F. KAID BENFIELD ET AL., ONCE THERE WERE GREENFIELDS 125 (1999).

35. Jerome Thompson, Public Transit: Can You Get Around, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
July 10, 2000, at G3.
36. See 1999 ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 48.
37. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS OF
POPULATION

AND HOUSING, POPULATION AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS FOR

CENSUS TRACTS AND BLOCK NUMBERING AREAS:

MACON-WARNER ROBINS, GA

MSA at 177 (1993). Cf. Alewine v. City Council, 699 F.2d 1060, 1069 (11th Cir. 1983)
("[A] small percentage of Macon's population require [sic] public transit.
").
38. See David G. Oedel, The Legacy of Jim Crow in Macon, Georgia, in JUST
TRANSPORTATION 97, 102 (Robert D. Bullard & Glenn S. Johnson, eds., 1997).
39. Id.
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residents out of the job market. 40 And many of Macon's employers
are not transit-accessible at all, because they are located on the area's
periphery, far from any bus line.41 As a result, Macon's employers of
unskilled labor often ask would-be employees whether they have a
car-and if the answer is no, the applicant won't be hired. 42
Macon's transportation system limits a wide variety of other
activities as well. The two largest Kroger supermarkets in Macon are
not on bus lines, nor is a large discount supermarket, FoodMax, or a
new Publix supermarket.43 Conversely, a largely abandoned shopping
center where anchor tenant K-Mart closed in 1991 is served by the
system-but a new K-Mart is not.44 Churches are not served by the
system at all, because churches tend to be most active on Sundays and
weekday evenings, when the bus system is shut down. 45 Even on the
bus system's limited routes, the frequency of service is so minimal as
to discourage use. For example, students who use public transit to
attend Macon College must devote the entire day to the ordeal.
After rising before 6 AM to catch the first bus from their homes to
the downtown transfer station, students must catch a morning bus
from downtown to the college at 7:30 AM. Later in the day, they
have only one opportunity to return home. 46 Needless to say, drivers
suffer from none of these limitations: government has built a tollfree, 24-hour system to serve them, and by building highways further
and further away from downtown Macon, has encouraged employers
to relocate to areas not served by bus routes. 47 So in Macon, as in
most of America, the transit-dependent disabled are more isolated
than ever.

40. Id. at 103.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 100 ("In theory, Macon's extensive road network may be used (or at least
indirectly enjoyed) by the entire population. In fact, however, the roads operate as
instruments of isolation for many residents without cars, [by] facilitating white flight to the
periphery [of the area]."). See also Alex Wayne, City Tries To Make Jobs Reachable,
GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., July 25, 1999, at BI (7 of High Point, North Carolina's 20
largest employers located along North Carolina Highway 68, which is not served by public
transportation; Chamber of Commerce official describes absence of transit as "a prime
reason that women are not able to work" based on survey showing that 75% of area public
housing residents viewed transportation as barrier to employment); infra notes 84-102 and
accompanying text (discussing impact of highways upon suburban development).
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Not surprisingly, the disabled have become poorer as suburbia
has sprawled beyond the reach of public transportation. For example,
in 1988, at the eve of the ADA's passage, men with disabilities earned
36% less than their non-disabled counterparts, as opposed to only
23% less in 1980.48 Similarly, in 1988 women with disabilities earned
38% less than their non-disabled counterparts, as opposed to only
30% in 1980. 49 Since the passage of the ADA, employment levels
among the disabled have continued to stagnate.50 There is no way of
knowing to what extent inadequate transportation (as opposed to
other factors) 5 ' caused this problem-but transportation problems
undoubtedly render the disabled less employable. 2 According to one
pre-ADA poll, 28% of unemployed Americans with disabilities
blamed lack of transportation for their unemployment.53
For
example, Jay Rochlin, then the Executive Director of the President's
Committee on Employment of Disabilities, informed Congress in

1988:

48. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 32 (1990).
49. Id. A more recent Harris poll survey for the National Organization on Disability
found that among people of working age (ages 18-64) only 32% of disabled persons held
full- or part-time jobs, compared to 81% of those without disabilities. See Survey Program
on Participation and Attitudes, available at http://www.nod.orglhs2000.html#execsum
[hereinafter Survey Program]. See also William Neikirk, Clinton Orders U.S. Agencies to
Hire More Disabled People, CHI. TRIB., July 27, 2000, at 16 (reporting testimony by
Department of Justice official that of the 30 million adults with significant disabilities, 75%
are unemployed or underemployed).
50. See Murray Weidenbaum, Why the DisabilitiesAct Is Missing Its Mark, CHRISTIAN
SC. MONITOR, Jan. 16, 1997, at 19 ("One survey reported that the portion of men with
disabilities who are working dropped from 33 percent in 1991 to 31 percent in 1995. Using
a different definition of disability, another study showed no change."); Liz Spayd, Poll
Finds Harsh Life for Disabled,WASH. POST, July 22, 1994, at A21 (Harris poll revealed
that "jobless levels for the disabled... show virtually no improvement over those revealed
in a Harris poll conducted eight years ago."); Pat Lee, Fence Post, CHI. DAILY HERALD,
Aug. 29, 1998, at 10 (1998 Harris poll revealed that "29 percent of those with disabilities
reported being employed full or part time. This rate is down 5 percentage points from the
1986 Harris poll in spite of the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990.").
51. See Weidenbaum, supra note 50 (blaming unemployment among the disabled on
overly generous government disability payments that discourage labor force
participation); Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for
Defendants?, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (1999) (suggesting that courts interpreting
ADA have narrowed its scope by favoring defendants).
52. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 37 (Numerous witnesses in Congressional
hearings pointed out that transportation is a major obstacle to the disabled.).
53. See Seth J. Elin, Curb Cuts Under Title II of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct
Are They Bringing Justice or Bankruptcy to Our Municipalities?,28 URB. LAW. 293, 297
(1996). The article cited a 1990 article referencing the poll; thus, the poll must have been
conducted before that date. Id. at 326 n.26.
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It makes little sense to protect an individual from discrimination in
employment if, for example, they have less than adequate
accessible public transportation services. We have conducted
surveys in 45 communities over the last seven years, and,
the
consistently, inaccessible transportation has been identified
54
major barrier, second only to discriminatory attitudes.
If inaccessible transportation keeps the disabled unemployed, it
logically follows that the decay of public transit in recent decades has
had something to do with the growth of poverty and unemployment
among the disabled.
(1) How GovernmentHas SabotagedPublic Transit
It could be argued that America's auto dependency is a natural
result of affluence 55 or of "America's romance with the
automobile. 5 6 But in fact, government has, in a wide variety of ways,
eliminated nondrivers' access to jobs and community facilities.
For most of the 20th century, government has funneled billions
of dollars into highway construction. 57 Highway construction
immobilizes the disabled by shifting development from areas
accessible to the transit-dependent disabled to areas inaccessible
except by automobile.58 In addition, government at all levels has
reduced transit system revenues through unfunded mandates,59 has
adopted education and housing policies that indirectly shifted
development to suburbs, 6° and has enacted zoning laws that made
those suburbs as auto-dependent as possible (thereby reducing transit
ridership and transit system revenues). 61 All of these policies have
immobilized the transit-dependent disabled, either by shifting
development to areas with minimal or nonexistent public transit or by
starving transit systems of revenue that they could have used to
expand service to such areas.

54. Id. (citation omitted).
55. See Kenneth A. Small, Transportationand Urban Change, in THE NEW URBAN
REALrrY 197, 205 (Paul E. Peterson ed., 1985) (asserting that increased auto use is a
natural result of higher incomes.).
56. Federico Cheever, The United States Forest Service and National Park Service:
ParadoxicalMandates, Powerful Founders, and the Rise and Fall of Agency Discretion,74
DENY. U. L. REv. 625, 636 (1997) (using phrase to explain auto traffic in national parks).
57. See infra notes 62-83 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 84-102 and accompanying text.

59. See infra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 122-28,138-57 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 129-38 and accompanying text.
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(2) Highway Policy

(a) How Govermnent Put Highways in the Driver's Seat

Early in the 20th century, state and federal governments began
to build new roads. State and local governments could have levied
user fees to force drivers to reimburse local treasuries for the costs of
streets, traffic maintenance, and police services-but instead

frequently chose to subsidize drivers by relying on general taxation. 62
Thus, government essentially taxed the general public (including

railroads, transit users, and rail users) to support drivers. 63 By
contrast, streetcar services were typically private and unsubsidized.r'
To make matters worse, streetcar fares were often controlled by
government and, despite World War I-era inflation, were not allowed
to rise.65 Because government regulated streetcars while subsidizing
drivers, one-third of American streetcar companies were bankrupt by
1919.66

Between 1919 and 1929, every state adopted a motor fuel tax and

earmarked the revenue therefrom to fund highway construction
projects. 67 By 1927, highways were second only to education as
recipients of state and local expenditure, and one-third 68of state
assistance to local government was for highway construction.
In 1921, the federal government began to support highway
building, by enacting a Federal Road Act69 that designated 200,000
miles of road as eligible for federal matching funds, and by creating a
Bureau of Public Roads to plan an interstate highway system.7 By
62. See JACKSON, supra note 21, at 163; Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v.
Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 425 (1935) (Motor vehicle-related fees "will not pay for one-half of
the usual expenditure in Tennessee for highways. The balance is being paid in part by
general property taxes.").
63. Walters, 294 U.S. at 425, 428 (noting that state taxed railroads to support highway
construction).
64. See PAUL WEYRICH & WILLIAM S. LIND, CONSERVATIVES AND MASS TRANSIT:

IS IT TIME FOR A NEW LOOK? 10 (1996); Alewine v. City Council, 699 F.2d 1060, 1068
(11th Cir. 1983) (until 1960, most transit systems privately owned).
65. WEYRICH & LIND, supra note 64, at 10.
66. Id.
67. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part If-Localism and Legal Theory, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 346,380 n.149 (1990).
68. Id. By this time, the states were also providing suburbs with sewers and water
service. By contrast, the states were less generous to cities because by the 1920s, cities had
already built similar facilities for their own citizens. Id.
69. 42 Stat. 212 (1921). Cf. State v. Smith, 295 P. 986, 997 (Kan. 1931) (referencing the
Road Act, and noting that it required state governments to build highways themselves
rather than relying on counties to do so).
70. JACKSON, supra note 21, at 167.
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that date, government at all levels (federal, state, and local) was
pouring $1.4 billion into highways. 71 By contrast, most transit systems
were privately owned, received no government assistance, and paid
taxes to support the highway system and other government
functionsy2
During the 1920s and 1930s, government's highway empire
continued to grow. By 1940, government spent $2.7 billion on
highways. 73 By contrast, at that time the total operating costs of all
intracity bus and rail systems (except commuter rail) were $661
million, and most of that sum was financed by private spending.74
In the postwar years, government intervention on behalf of
highways accelerated. In 1950, government funneled $4.6 billion into
highways, and virtually nothing into transit.75 And in 1954, President
Eisenhower appointed a committee on highways chaired by Lucius
Clay, a member of the General Motors board of directors.76 Not
surprisingly, the committee endorsed a massive highway spending
plan. That scheme was enacted into law as the Interstate Highway
78
Act,77 which created a 41,000 mile Interstate Highway System.
Under the Act, the federal government paid for 90% of the system's
construction and maintenance costs, states paid 10%, and
municipalities paid nothing.7 9 By contrast, the federal government
did not begin to subsidize public transit until the 1960s. 80 In fact,
between 1950 and 1970 vehicle miles of transit service declined
nationally by 37%.81 Today, federal road spending exceeds transit
71. WEYRICH & LIND, supra note 64, at 10.
72. Id.

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE:
AND DECLINE OF AMERICA'S MAN-MADE LANDSCAPE 106 (1993).

THE RISE

77. See Pub. L. No. 85-767,72 Stat. 885.
78. See KUNSTLER, supra note 76, at 106-07.
79. See Movement Against Destruction v. Volpe, 361 F. Supp. 1360, 1367 (D. Md.
1973); NORQUIST, supra note 24, at 153.
80. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOV'T:
HISTORICAL TABLES, FISCAL YEAR 1996 (1995) (first federal mass transit spending listed

in 1962). See also Town of Secaucus v. United States, 889 F. Supp. 779, 783-84 (D.N.J.
1995).
81. See Norman Krumholz & Janice Cogger, Urban Transportation Equity in
Cleveland, in METROPOLITAN MIDWEST: POLICY PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR
CHANGE 211, 211 (Barry Checkoway & Carl V. Patton eds., 1985) [hereinafter
Checkoway]. Cf 49 U.S.C. § 5301(b)(4) (legislative finding that "in the early 1970's
continuing even minimal mass transportation service in urban areas was threatened
because maintaining that transportation service was financially burdensome").
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spending by a margin of more than 5-1.82 Moreover, state
governments are often even more pro-road and anti-transit than the
federal government; for example, some states require fuel tax
revenues to be spent exclusively on roads.83
(b) How Highway Spending Harms the Transit-Dependent

As noted above, many American suburbs have minimal (or even
nonexistent) public transit.84 Highways caused jobs and community
activities to move to these auto-dependent suburbs, thus depriving
the transit-dependent of jobs and other opportunities.
At first, highways merely enabled commuters to live farther away
from downtown jobs, thus giving commuters easy access to central
business districts from once-distant suburbs. 85 But where highwaydriven residential development came, commercial development
inevitably followed, as retail businesses moved to suburbs in order to
82. See Liam A. McCann, TEA-21: Paving over Efforts to Stem Urban Sprawl and
Reduce America's Dependence on the Automobile, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
REV. 857, 859 (1999) ("[M]ore than eighty percent of the money in TEA-21 [the 1998
transportation funding bill] will go toward highway funding."); Jeff Plungis, Auto Research
Faces Cutbacks, DETROIT NEWS, March 1, 2001 (Bush administration proposed highway
spending of $32.3 billion and transit spending of $6.7 billion, increases from $30.2
billion and $6.2 billion respectively); 1999 ABSTRACr, supra note 2, at 636. A similar gap
exists at other levels of government. See 1999 ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 635, 652;
Electronic correspondence from Daniel Duff, American Public Transit Association (Feb.
9, 2000) (on file with author) (stating that government highway spending 5.4 times as high
as transit spending). And to the extent government has invested in transit, those
investments have sometimes redistributed money from bus service to more expensive train
service rather than expanding riders' transit options. See Peter Gordon & Harry W.
Richardson, Defending Suburban Sprawl, PUB. INT., Spring 2000, at 65, 69 (Some cities'
"bus systems have been cannibalized to pay for rail."); Eric Mann, Confronting Transit
Racism in Los Angeles, in JUST TRANSPORTATION 68,71 (Robert D. Bullard & Glenn S.
Johnson eds., 1996) (Los Angeles reduced bus mileage by 16% between 1988 and 1997
while building subway).
83. See State ex. rel. O'Connell, 452 P.2d 943, 948 (Wash. 1969) (state not allowed to
spend gasoline tax revenue on public transportation, based on provision in state
Constitution requiring such revenue to be spent for highway-related purposes); Michigan
Road Builders Ass'n v. Dep't of Mgmt. & Budget, 495 N.W.2d 843, 847 (Mich. App. 1992)
(Under Michigan law, 90% of gas and license tax revenue must be used for roads.).
84. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
85. See Penny Mintz, TransportationAlternatives Within the CleanAir Act: A History
of CongressionalFailure to Effectuate and Recommendations for the Future, 3 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 156, 159 (1994) ("Highways made land outside cities accessible, which in turn
made the land attractive for development."); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A.
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID 44 (1993) ("In making this transition from urban to
suburban life, middle-class whites demanded and got massive federal investments in
highway construction that permitted rapid movement to and from central cities by car.").
Cf City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 675 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting possible "urban
sprawl" caused by new highway interchange).
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serve those suburbs' new residents and other businesses followed
their employees to suburbia.8 6 As one federal court has pointed out,

"[h]ighways create demand for travel and [suburban] expansion by
their very existence. '"87
For example, Washington's Capital Beltway, a 66-mile long
highway surrounding the city, was designed to allow East Coast
motorists to bypass the city.88 But instead, the Beltway became a

magnet for office and retail centers that sprouted near Beltway exits,
such as Tyson's Comer, a satellite downtown in Fairfax County,
Virginia.8 9 And as suburbs grew more populated, they grew more
congested, which caused politicians to build even more suburban
roads (ostensibly to relieve congestion) thus spurring development in
even more suburbs. 90 A study by the Surface Transportation Policy
Project showed that each of the 50 largest metro areas in America

added new road capacity in the 1980s and 1990s.91
86. See Gordon & Richardson, supra note 82, at 70 ("[Flirms now follow the labor
force to the suburbs where their employees live."); Earl Daniels, Building Boom: Area's
Residential, Commercial Growth Spurt, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Jan. 13, 2000, at El (quoting
Jacksonville realtor Barry Goldstein's statement that "[w]e have population growth in the
suburban area, and when you have the growth of residential, you have a demand for other
services"); WOLFGANG ZUCKERMANN, END OF THE ROAD: THE WORLD CAR CRISIS

AND How WE CAN SOLVE IT 240 (1991) ("[T]he new road system had drawn many of the
former city-center shoppers to new homes in the suburbs. Many retail firms consequently
abandoned downtowns to develop new stores on the periphery of urban areas where
motorists could easily reach them using the freeway system. In many cases, offices
followed suit, and some suburban downtowns developed around freeway intersections.").
87. Sierra Club, v. United States Dep't of Transp., 962 F. Supp. 1037, 1043 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (citing Swann v. Brinegar, 517 F.2d 766, 777 (7th Cir. 1975)).
88. See Glen Frankel & Stephen C. Fehr, As the Economy Grows, The Trees Fall,
WASH. POST, Mar. 23,1997, at Al.
89. Id. See also JACKSON, supra note 21, at 165 (pointing out that many of Detroit's
suburbs have risen along major roads).
90. See, e.g., Alan Sipress, Widen the Roads, Drivers Will Come, WASH. POST, Jan. 4,
1999, at B1 (discussing Maryland's widening of 1-270 near Washington, which spurred
suburban development but failed to reduce congestion); Stephen Fehr, Montgomery's
Line of Defense Against the Suburban Invasion, WASH. POST., Mar. 25, 1997, at Al
(discussing developers' support for a new highway linking Washington's Maryland suburbs
with its Virginia suburbs, ostensibly in order to reduce congestion on Washington's
Beltway); Glenn Frankel & Peter Pae, In Loudoun, Two Worlds Collide, WASH. POST,
Mar. 24, 1997, at Al (In Loudoun County, a suburb of Washington, the "four-lane Dulles
Greenway, a toll road designed to ease the commute for eastern residents, has opened up
the west for further growth."). Loudoun County, like most newer suburbs, has minimal
bus service. See Jennifer Lenhart, A Needed Lift, WASH. POST Nov. 8, 1999, at B1
(describing isolation of elderly nondrivers who moved to Loudoun County to live near
adult children).
91. See Surface Transportation Policy Project, Why Are the Roads so Congested?, at
http:l/www.transact.orglconstr99/default.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2000) [hereinafter
Roads]. Frequently, the new and widened highways have been located in the newest, most
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As a consequence of (among other factors) 92 government's roadbuilding sprees, 93 many older American cities had suffered enormous
population losses by the end of the 20th century. At the end of World
War II, roughly 70% of metropolitan Americans lived in central
cities. 94 But by 1990, only about 40% of metropolitan Americans, and
only 31.3% of all Americans, lived in central cities. 95 Some central
affluent outer suburbs, thus increasing the inequality in tax bases and services between
those suburbs and central cities or less politically favored suburbs. See Jerry Frug, The
Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1099 (1996); Myron Orfield, Talk
Radio Called Him a Commie and Put Him on Hold, MINN. STAR TRIB., May 23, 1995, at
13A (In Minneapolis/St. Paul, "the southern and western outer-ring suburbs have gotten
all of the new freeways and sewer systems-billions of dollars in improvements-and
therefore virtually all of the region's new tax base.").
92. See infra notes 122-29, 139-64 and accompanying text (describing other
government policies causing middle-class flight to suburbia); Jonathan Simon, From a
Tight Place: Crime, Punishmentand American Liberalism, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 853,
856 (1999) (noting that urban crime another factor causing middle-class flight to suburbs).
93. It has been argued that highways do not cause migration to suburbia because
"[s]uburbanization was well underway in 1960, when the federal interstate highway
program had been in existence for just four years." Ronald Utt, Cities and Suburbs, at
http://www.heritage.orglissues/chap13.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2000). See also Peter
Gordon & Harry W. Richardson, Critiquing Sprawl's Critics, CATO INST. POL'Y
ANALYSIS No. 365, at 6 (Jan. 24, 2000) (Interstate highway program was not a cause of
suburban migration because "there was significant suburbanization before 1956."). This
argument lacks merit for three reasons. First, the state and federal governments had
begun to support highway building long before the interstate highway system was built.
See supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text. Thus, highway-building may have caused
suburban growth before the enactment of interstate highway legislation. Second, other
antiurban government policies (such as the Federal Housing Administration's policy of
providing mortgage insurance to suburbanites but not to city-dwellers) had also been in
effect for decades before 1960. See Michael E. Lewyn, The Urban Crisis: Made in
Washington, 4 J. L. & POL'Y 513, 546-49 (1996) (describing FHA policies in more detail);
infra notes 122-28 and accompanying text. Third, American cities' most stunning setbacks
occurred after the creation of the interstate highway program. Of the 18 American cities
which had more than 500,000 people in 1950, every single one gained population between
1930 and 1950. See INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 1955, at 215-18 (Dan Golepaul ed.,
1954). By contrast, in the 1950s, 13 of the cities lost population, and 2 lost over 10% of
their population. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACrS 1976, at 210 (George
E. DeLury ed., 1975) [hereinafter WORLD ALMANAC 1976]. In the 1960s, 15 lost
population, and 6 lost over 10%. Id. And in the disastrous 1970s, 16 lost population and
14 lost over 10%. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACrS 2000, at 390 (Robert
Famighetti ed., 1999) [hereinafter WORLD ALMANAC 2000]. In other words, the
redistribution of people from city to suburb snowballed as interstates were built during the
1960s and 1970s.
94. See DAVID RuSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 5 (2d ed. 1995); BENFIELD ET AL.,
supra note 34, at 120.
95. See Shelby D. Green, The Search for a National Land Use Policy: For the Cities'
Sake, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 69, 73 (1998) (citing 1990 census statistics). Cf. Dixon v.
Hassler, 412 F. Supp. 1036, 1045 (W.D. Tenn. 1976), affd, 429 U.S. 934 (1976) (by 1960s,
"most cities in the United States lost population... except for gains in the suburban
surrounding areas by way of annexation").
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cities have been devastated by sprawl: for example, St. Louis has lost
60% of its population since 1950, while Buffalo and Cleveland have
lost over 45% of their population. 96

The cities that have gained

population have grown either by being hubs for immigration from
other countries (like New York and Los Angeles) or by annexing
newly developed areas that would be considered suburbs in other
cities (like Little Rock, Indianapolis, and Albuquerque). 97 Jobs, as
well as people, have fled to suburbia: 98 about 95% of the 15 million

new office jobs created in the 1980s were in suburbs,99 and suburbs
captured 120% of net job growth in manufacturing. 1°°
Indeed, even organizations generally regarded as supportive of
new roads and suburban expansion implicitly concede that highways
affect the location of development. For example, in 1999 the
National Association of Home Builders (which favors increased road
spending)' 01 conducted a survey that asked respondents what
amenities would encourage them to move to a new area, and their top
choice (endorsed by 55% of respondents) was "highway access."' 1 2 If
highway access makes a suburb more desirable, it follows when the
government builds a suburban highway, people and jobs move to
locations near highway exits.

96. See WORLD ALMANAC 2000, supra note 93, at 390.
97. See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d 404,
412 (8th Cir. 1985) (white population of city of Little Rock declined from 1950 to 1980 if
annexed territory excluded, but increased by over 30% if annexed territory included);
RUSK,supra note 94, at 4.
98. See Parents Assoc. v. Ambach, 451 F. Supp. 1056, 1060 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
("Businesses have left the City, sometimes to the suburbs to which their middle-income
'white collar' workers have preceded them.").
99. See BENFIELD ET AL., supra note 34, at 14.
100. Id. This number exceeds 100% because cities were losing manufacturing jobs
while suburbs were gaining such jobs. Id. See also NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713,
742 (N.J. 1975) (noting shift of industrial jobs to suburbs).
101. See NAHB's Policy on Smart Growth, at http://www.nahb.comlmainfeatures
smartpolicy.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2000) ("Ensuring that the construction of schools,
roads and other infrastructure keeps pace with the anticipated growth in population and
economic activity is one of the biggest challenges facing [suburban] communities today.")
[hereinafter NAHB Policy Statement].
102. See National Association of Home Builders, Consumer Survey on Growth, at
http:/lwww.nahb.comlmain-features/smarLsurvey/summary.htm Issues (last visited Feb. 8,
2000) [hereinafter NAHB Growth Survey]. Similarly, Gordon and Richardson, in an
article entitled "Defending Suburban Sprawl" (which seeks to do exactly that) admit in
passing that "[g]ood highways and other communications reversed [the migration of jobs
to cities] in the late twentieth century." Gordon & Richardson, supranote 82, at 70.
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(c) Throwing the Disabled (and Everyone Else) Off the Bus
The state and federal governments' highway spending spree
would not have harmed the disabled if those governments had built
buses and trains to bring the transit-dependent to suburban jobs and
civic centers. But instead, government effectively decreased service
that is,
for nondrivers while increasing service for drivers:
government drove private transit companies out of business by
funding competition from highways, took over what was left of transit
service, and actually reduced transit service while it was doing so.' 03
During the first half of the 20th century, governments at all levels
poured billions into highways while buses, trains and streetcars were
privately owned and had to make do without government subsidy.1 4
In fact, governments actually taxed streetcar companies to support
highway spending, 10 5 and starved streetcar companies of revenue by
06
limiting fares.
While the federal government was funding the interstate highway
system in the 1950s and 1960s, local governments began to take over
failing transit systems. 107 But local governments did not increase
transit service so that riders could reach auto-oriented suburbs.
Instead, government reduced transit service in two ways: first by
building highways to places unserved by public transit' 08 (thus causing
opportunities to migrate to those areas) 09 and second by reducing
service to places that already had public transit. Between 1950 and
1970, vehicle miles of public transit service declined nationally by
37%.110 According to a legislative finding contained in the Urban

Mass Transportation Act, "in the early 1970's continuing even
minimal mass transportation service in urban areas was
threatened."n

103.
104.
105.
106.

See supra notes 62-81 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 62-80 and accompanying text.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.

107. See Alewine v. City Council, 699 F.2d 1060, 1068 (11th Cir. 1983) (until 1960, most
transit systems were privately owned).
108. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text (noting that many American suburbs
have minimal transit service).
109. See supra notes 85-102 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. Cf Larry Sandier, How Buses Fare,
MILWAUKEE J.-SENTINEL, Aug. 21, 1996, at 1 (Milwaukee County's average daily bus
service decreased by 29% between 1963 to 1990.).
111. 49 U.S.C. § 5301(b)(4).
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The federal government began to support public transit in the
early 1960s,1 2 but today federal road spending exceeds transit
spending by about a 5-1 margin.113 And some suggest that even this
sum is too much, because transit systems receive 15-20% of all federal
spending even though transit users comprise about 5% of all
commuters." 4 This argument overlooks the fact that federal transit

spending is canceled out by a variety of federal mandates, including
(1) the ADA itself, which alone cost transit providers $1.4 billion per
year in the mid-1990s, about 1/3 of federal transit spending,1 5 (2)
116
labor laws that limit transit operators' ability to reduce labor costs
(which alone may cost transit providers $2-3 billion per year," 7 about
half of all federal transit spending)," 8 (3) imposition of federally
mandated wage rates for federally funded construction," 9 (4)

limitations upon transit systems' use of parts manufactured in foreign
countries, 20 and (5) limitations on charter and school bus service in
competition with the private sector.' 2 ' Every dollar that transit
112. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
113. See McCann, supranote 82, at 859; Duff, supra note 82, Plungis, supranote 82.
114. See Utt, supra note 93 (making argument); Larry Sandier, Views on Transit Funds
Diverge, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL, Apr. 24,1995, at B2 (quoting similar views by
Wisconsin transit official); 1999 ABSTRACr, supra note 2, at 641 (5.3% of all Americans
use public transit to get to work).
115. See Hynes-Cherin, supra note 11 (ADA cost transit providers $1.4 billion
annually); Doherty, supra note 11 (ADA paratransit provisions alone cost transit
operators $1.1 billion annually); 1999 ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 314 (Federal transit
spending ranged between $3.9 billion and $4.3 billion between fiscal years 1995 and 1999.);
but cf. Plungis, supra note 82 (transit spending increased to just over $6 billion in early
2000s). As explained below, transit operators have often been forced to reduce service in
order to meet ADA-related expenses. See infra notes 369, 394-97, 402-05 and
accompanying text.
116. See 49 U.S.C. § 5333 (Laborers on transit-related construction projects must be
paid "wages not less than those prevailing on similar construction in the locality" and
transit employees must be protected against diminution of collective bargaining rights or
"worsening of their positions related to employment."); Greenfield & Montague Transp.
Area v. Donovan, 758 F.2d 22, 23 (Ist Cir. 1985) (describing statute); John Walters, BusJacking the Revolution, POL'Y REV., Jan./Feb. 1996, at 8 (same).
117. Id
118. See 1999 ABSTRACr, supra note 2, at 636 (federal government granted state and
local government $4.56 billion for public transit in 1997).
119. See 49 U.S.C. § 5333(a); N. Ga. Bldg. & Trades Constr. Council v. Metro Atlanta
Rapid Transit Auth., 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9862, at *3-4 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 1982)
(describing requirement).
120. See 49 U.S.C. § 53230); Seal & Co. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 768 F.
Supp. 1150 (E.D. Va. 1991) (describing requirement).
121. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 5323(d) & (f); Chi. Transit Auth. v. Adams, 607 F.2d 1284, 1293
(7th Cir. 1979) (discussing protection of school bus companies); Blue Bird Coach Lines v.
Linton, 48 F. Supp. 2d 47, 49 (D.D.C. 1999) (discussing protection of charter bus
companies).
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systems spend or forego in order to comply with these federal rules
and regulations is a dollar that they cannot use to expand or preserve
service.
(3) OtherAnti-TransitPolicies

Moreover, highway spending is hardly the only government
expenditure that has reduced transit use or moved jobs away from
transit users. Over the past several decades, a wide variety of
government policies have indirectly encouraged Americans to move

to areas unserved by public transit, including:
9 Federal Housing Administration mortgage insurance. Since

1934, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has insured longterm, low down-payment mortgages against default. 122 By 1986, the
federal government backed 2/3 of the single-family mortgages in the
United States. 123 For many years, FHA guaranteed home loans only
in "low-risk" areas. 124 Specifically, FHA manuals taught that the
FHA should favor newer, lower-density areas because "crowded
neighborhoods lessen desirability [and] older properties in a
neighborhood have a tendency to accelerate the transition to lower
class occupancy."' 2 5 Public transit is less feasible in lower-density
areas, because as houses and apartments are spread farther apart,
fewer people can conveniently walk to bus and train stops. 126 So by
122. See United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1057 (N.D. Ohio 1980),
appeal dismissed, 633 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1980); Michael H. Schill & Susan Wachter, The
SpatialBias of FederalHousing Law and Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban America,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285,1308 (1995).
123. See GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING 132-33 (1999).
124. See JACKSON, supra note 21, at 207. In fact, the overwhelming majority of FHA
loans went to suburban home buyers. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 85, at 54
(describing FHA favoritism towards suburbs in St. Louis, Washington, and New York City
metropolitan areas); George Steven Swan, The PoliticalEconomy of American Apartheid.
Shaw v. Reno, 11 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 21 (1994) (FHA did not insure one mortgage
in Camden or Paterson, New Jersey, until 1966.). The FHA became less biased against
cities in the late 1960s, but by that time the damage had already been done; America's
older cities had already skidded into a cycle of decay and decline. See Jackson, supra note
21, at 214-15 (describing more recent FHA policies); WORLD ALMANAC 1976, supra note
93, at 210 (older cities had begun to decline in 1950s and 1960s); MASSEY & DENTON,
supranote 85, at 53 (describing long term damage to cities caused by loss of middle class).
125. See JACKSON, supra note 21, at 207.
126. See JAMES J. MACKENZIE ET AL., THE GOING RATE: WHAT IT REALLY COSTS
TO DRIVE 26 (1992) ("Densities above 7 housing units per acre are needed for costeffective bus service while densities of over 9 housing units per acre are needed for costeffective light rail service."); PIETRO S. NIVOLA, LAWS OF THE LANDSCAPE 15-16 (1999)
("The abandonment of public transportation is primarily a consequence of lower per
capita incomes and low urban density. The clustered populations and workplaces of
European and Japanese cities offer the critical mass needed to maintain comparatively
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bribing homeowners to move to low-density suburbs, the FHA
inadvertently reduced transit ridership by causing population to shift
to areas where public transit was inconvenient or nonexistent. Such
population shifts caused reductions in transit service, both because
declining ridership arguably justifies reductions in service 27 and
because jobs eventually followed people to the suburbs' 28 (thus
reducing the number of jobs accessible to transit-dependent

urbanites).
* Zoning policies that made suburbs as auto-dominated as
possible. In the 1920s, the federal Department of Commerce drafted
the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA).2 9 SZEA, which
was quickly enacted by the majority of states, 130 granted
3
municipalities power to regulate the location and use of buildings.' '
The SZEA declared that such legislation would be designed to
"prevent the overcrowding of land [and] to avoid undue
concentration of population"' 32-in
other words, to reduce
population density. SZEA-inspired zoning ordinances have reduced
densities by limiting apartment construction 33 or by forcing all homes
in a neighborhood to be the same size. 34 For example, in 1970 more
than 99% of vacant land in New Jersey was zoned to exclude
high levels of transit ridership, whereas the decentralized urban conurbations of the
United States are more efficiently served by automotive transportation.").
127. See, e.g., Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Myth of Suburban Sprawl, USA TODAY, May
1, 2000, (Magazine), at 5456, available at 2000 WL 9014855 (attacking public transit
spending on the grounds that ridership has declined since 1945).
128. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
129. See Department of Commerce, Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (1926) (final
version).
130. See Ex Parte City of Huntsville, 684 So. 2d 123, 125 (Ala. 1996) (SZEA used as a
"model for zoning legislation in the majority of states"); 1 ANDERSON'S AMERICAN LAW
OF ZONING § 2.21 at 67-69 (Kenneth H. Young ed., 4th ed. 1995) (describing history of
SZEA and pointing out that as early as 1930, 35 states had adopted that statute in whole
or in part, and that "[a]ll of the states finally adopted zoning enabling legislation and most
reflect the thinking of the draftsmen of the Standard Act").
131. See Chapman v. City of Troy, 45 So. 2d 1, 8, 241 Ala. 637, 639 (1941) (SZEA gives
cities power to "divide the city into districts, and regulate the erection and use of the
buildings in the several districts for trade, industry, residence or other purposes."); Lee R.
Epstein, Where Yards Are Wide: Have Land Use Planningand Law Gone Astray?, 21
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.& POL'Y REv. 345,357-58 (1997).
132. SZEA, § 3, quoted by Epstein, supra note 131, at 379 n.50.
133. See, e.g., Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding ordinance limiting
land use to single family homes).
134. See, e.g., Simone v. Worcester County Inst. for Savings, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
9081, at *6 (1st Cir. Apr. 20, 1995) (Worcester zoning law required 8000 square foot lot for
2 family home). See also Paul S. Weiland, Environment in Context, 18 UCLA J. ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 131, 138 (1999/2000) ("[Cjurrent zoning practices often forbid high density
development and mixed-use development.").
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multifamily housing, and in Connecticut's Fairfield County 89% of
vacant land was subject to minimum lot requirements of one acre or
more. 135 Such anti-density zoning reduces transit use because, as
noted above, 136 public transit is less feasible in low-density areas: as
residences are spread farther apart, fewer people can walk short
distances to bus and train stops. So by using highway spending to
create suburbs while zoning those suburbs to be auto-dependent,
government reduced transit providers' revenues in two ways: first by
reducing transit providers' urban ridership, and second by making it
difficult for transit providers to serve suburbanites. And by reducing
transit providers' revenues, government forced them to cut back
37
service to transit-dependent individuals.
* Public housingpolicies that, by concentratingpoverty and crime
in cities, drove middle-class families out of cities. New Deal-era
federal housing legislation provided that any municipality desiring
public housing had to create a municipal housing authority or to
cooperate with another city's housing authority. 138
Thus,
economically homogenous suburbs were able to avoid public housing
39
by refusing to create or cooperate with housing authorities.
Moreover, the federal government's "equivalent elimination
requirement" kept public housing out of suburbs by mandating that
one unit of substandard housing be eliminated for each unit of public
housing built. 140
Because most suburbs had little substandard
housing, even suburbs that wished to participate in the public housing

135. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: PartI- The Structure of Local Government

Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV.1, 41 (1990). The purpose of such zoning is usually to exclude
lower-income persons. See JACKSON, supra note 21, at 242 (Zoning "served the general
purpose of preserving residential class segregation and property values."). In one
Chicago-area suburban neighborhood, city planners seek to fix a minimum price of

$275,000. See Kara Spak, Elgin, Hoffman Seen as Ripe for Senior Housing, CHICAGO
DAILY HERALD, Jan. 26, 2001 ("Elgin's Far West Area plan dictates the average homoe
price in the area will be $325,000, with a minimum home price of $275,000.").
136. See supranote 126 and accompanying text.
137. See infra note 392 and accompanying text (describing reductions in transit service
due to 1990s revenue reductions).
138. See Jaimes v. Toledo Metro. Hous. Auth., 758 F.2d 1086, 1091 n.11 (6th Cir. 1985);
JACKSON, supra note 21, at 224.

139. See Briffault, supra note 135, at 41("[I]n all areas suburban localities sought to
exclude public or publicly subsidized housing."); Jaimes, 758 F.2d at 1096 n.23, 1097-98
(noting Toledo suburbs' refusal to allow public housing, which caused nearly all public

housing units to be in city of Toledo); United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562,566-67
(6th Cir. 1981) (describing similar obstructionism in Cleveland suburb); JACKSON, supra

note 21, at 224.
140. See Schill & Wachter, supra note 122, at 1293.
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program were excluded.' 41 As a result of these limitations, many
suburbs have little or no public housing. 42 Public housing projects
are by law packed with poverty: 60% of all occupants of existing
public housing must earn less than 30% of their metro area's median
income. 143 Because homogeneously poor areas tend, other factors
144
being equal, to be more crime-ridden than more affluent areas,
public housing projects are "havens for crime.'

45

Nationally, public

housing residents are two and a half times as likely as other
Americans to be victimized by gun-related crimes-and some projects
are even more horrendous.1 46 For example, Chicago's Robert Taylor

Homes housing projects contain only one-half of 1 percent of that
city's population, but account for 11% of the city's murders. 47
Similarly, a 1993 study found that crime in the Los Angeles housing
projects was three times greater than crime rates in surrounding highcrime neighborhoods. 48 So by concentrating public housing in
central cities, the federal government has concentrated poverty and
crime in cities, thus accelerating the flight of the middle class and

their employers to suburbia, 149 which in turn (as noted above) both
reduces the share of people and jobs served by transit and, by
reducing ridership, justifies reductions in transit service. 50
141. Id.
142. See Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, 435 (D. Del.), affd per curium, 423 U.S.
963 (1975) (Wilmington housing authority operated 2000 public housing units in city but
fewer than 40 in suburbs.); Robert E. Mendelson & Michael A. Quinn, Residential
Patternsin a Midwestern City: The St. Louis Experience, in Checkoway, supra note 81, at
151, 163 (In 1970 St. Louis had 10,000 units of public housing while suburban St. Louis
County, with a larger population, had only 50.).
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437n(a). See also Schill & Wachter, supra note 122, at 1294-95
n.43 (law was even more restrictive in 1980s).
144. See Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of N.Y., 74 F. Supp. 2d 321, 335
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (equating "high-crime" areas with "low-income" areas) (citation
omitted); Douglas S. Massey, GettingAway with Murder: Segregation and Violent Crime
in UrbanAmerica, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1203, 1215 (1995) ("Using least squares regression,
I estimate the relationship between crime and poverty to be: Major Crime Rate = 36.55
+.02 (percentage white) + .79 (poverty rate), where the units are census tracts and crime
rates are expressed per 1000 inhabitants.").
145. Rucker v. Davis, 2000 U.S. LEXIS App. 1966, at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 13,2000).
146. See Gary Fields, Gun Risk Double in Public Housing, USA TODAY, Feb. 17,2000,
at 3A.
147. See Utt, supra note 93. See also U.S. v. Thompson, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1420, at
*1 (N.D. Il1. 1992) (describing project as "notorious" for crime); NIcHOLAs LEMANN,
THE PROMISED LAND 295 (1991) (Robert Taylor Homes "quite possibly the worst place
in the country in which to raise a family").
148. See Utt, supra note 93.
149. See Simon, supra note 92, at 856 (noting that crime a factor in middle-class flight to
suburbs).
150. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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* Prestigious schools for suburbs and "bad" schools for cities.
Over the past several decades, many American parents have moved
to suburbia in order to keep their children out of urban public
schools.' 5 ' This problem is a consequence of state governments'
school assignment policies. In most of America, students are assigned
to public schools based on their home addresses:152 urban students
must generally attend school within an urban school district, while
suburban children attend suburban schools. Thus, a public school's
student body typically reflects the city or neighborhood in which the
students reside. Because cities tend to be more socially diverse than
suburbs, 53 the average city school will nearly always have more lowincome children than the average suburban school. Other factors
being equal, low-income children are harder to educate and achieve
less than middle-income children, because "socioeconomic status
(SES) and family background influence a student's achievement in
school. ' 154 This is so because "children reared in low socioeconomic
status [households] tend to be less intellectually stimulated and,
consequently, tend to be less prepared for school which ultimately
impacts on a child's achievements."' 55 It logically follows that as long
as state and local laws require urban children to attend schools
packed with low-income children, urban schools will drive away
middle-class parents. And as noted above, when middle-class families
flee to auto-dominated suburbs, the businesses that cater to them and

151. See, e.g., Vicki Been, Comment on Professor Jerry Frug's The Geography of
Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1110 (1996) ("When I talk to the mothers and fathers
of my children's friends about their inevitably impending move to the suburbs, they talk
about the higher standard of living they will enjoy there... [including] the savings of
writing one check for property taxes rather than one for property taxes and another for
the private school tuition."); Kristin Kovacic, New Century, Same Place, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETrE, Jan. 1, 2000, at A19 ("[O]ur children were fast approaching school age.
The rational response appeared to be moving to -a suburban area with a good school
district. Many city families we know were starting to move to these [suburbs] for the
schools alone.").
152- See KERN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID ALEXANDER, THE LAW OF SCHOOLS,
STUDENTS AND TEACHERS IN A NUTSHELL 9 (1995) ("[M]ost state laws require children
to attend school in the district in which the student resides.").
153. See BENFIELD ET AL., supra note 34, at 123 (central cities contain half of
America's poor, though they contain only 30% of total population).
154. Reed v. Rhodes, 1 F. Supp. 2d 705,738 (N.D. Ohio 1998). In fact, the "quality" of
schooling may influence- as little as 2-3% of differences in students' educational
See CHRISTOPHER JENCKS ET AL., INEQUALITY 109, 159 (1972)
achievement.
(differences among elementary schools account for 3% of inequalities in educational
achievement, and differences among high schools account for 2% of such inequalities).
155. Reed, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 739.
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employ them eventually do so as well, 156 thus reducing opportunities
157
for transit-dependent Americans.
- A tax code that favors driving and suburban life. Employers

may provide parking to their employers as a tax-free fringe benefit
worth up to $170 a month, while the tax-free ceiling on transit passes
is only $65 per month.158 To a much greater extent than European
countries, America taxes income and savings rather than
consumption. 159 Thus, the tax code encourages Americans to

and the large suburban houses
purchase space-consuming items
160
necessary to house those items.

These policies have combined to place older cities in a vicious
spiral of decay: as middle-class families fled to the suburbs, urban tax
bases diminished, causing politicians to raise taxes or reduce services,
further accelerating middle-class flight, creating additional pressures
for tax increases, and so on.161 And as urban neighborhoods emptied

out, middle-class families were replaced by poor ones,162 thus causing
crime to increase,'163 thus accelerating middle-class fRight.

In turn, the middle-class exodus from older cities and
neighborhoods has adversely affected transit-dependent Americans

(including, of course, the disabled) in two ways.' 64 First, as employers
fled cities, they relocated to places with minimal public transit, thus
reducing the number of jobs accessible to transit-dependent
Americans. 165 Second, as middle-class families left the city, they also
156. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (noting that jobs follow middle class to
suburbs).
157. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text (noting that transit service in suburbs
often quite limited).
158. See NIVOLA, supra note 126, at 25.
159. Id. at 25-26.
160. Id. at 26.
161. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 85, at 55; Arnold W. Reitze, A Century of Air
Pollution Control Law: What's Worked, What's Failed, What Might Work, 21 ENVTL. L.
1549,1574 (1991).
162. See PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE 50-57, 223-26 (1997) (in 1970s
and 1980s, number of high-poverty census tracts increased in most American cities; for
example, in 1980, Milwaukee had only 9 census tracts where over 40% of residents had
incomes below federal poverty rate, but by 1990 number had increased to 42).
163. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (crime higher in poverty-packed
neighborhoods).
164. And to the extent transit-dependent Americans are disproportionately city
dwellers, they, like other urbanites, suffered from higher taxes and higher crime due to
middle-class flight to suburbia, as city neighborhoods became poorer and city tax bases
declined. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 85, at 55; Lewyn, supra note 93, at 521.
165. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text (noting that most suburban jobsites
not transit-accessible).
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abandoned urban transit systems, pushing public transit into a vicious
spiral: reduced ridership could be used to justify reductions in
service, 166 which in turn reduced ridership, which decreased transit
system revenues, causing additional service reductions and fare
increases ad infinitum.167

H. Disability Law and Transit-Dependent Americans
A. Historical Background: Before the ADA

As early as the 1970s, the federal government sought to expand
disabled Americans' access to public transportation.
168
Section 16(a) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act (UMTA),
enacted in 1970,169 provided that:
elderly and handicapped persons have the same right as other
persons to utilize mass transportation facilities and services; that
special efforts shall be made in the planning and design of mass
transportation services so that the availability to elderly and
handicapped persons of mass transportation that they can
effectively utilize will be assured .... 170
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 similarly provided
that:
[n]o otherwise qualified person with handicaps in the United
States... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
166. See, e.g., DiLorenzo, supra note 127 (describing transit spending as "wasteful"
because ridership has declined since 1945); Editorial, Continuing Ridership Decline is
Everyone's Concern, PITrSBURGH PoST-GAZETTE, Feb. 27, 1994, at D2 (When ridership
declines, "operating costs must be reduced, service cut, fares increase or... subsidies
raised.").
167. See Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 873 F.2d 655, 665 (3d Cir. 1989)
("[I]ncreases in fares or reductions in the quality or availability of service have the
tendency of reducing ridership, and the reduction in ridership in turn diminishes
revenue.") (Rosenn, J., dissenting); Frank Donze, Riders Oppose HigherRTA Fares, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 20, 1999, at BI (quoting rider's suggestion that New
Orleans transit agency in "death spiral"); Gary Washburn, New Roads Won't Ease Traffic
Jams, Report Says, Cm. TRIB., Apr. 2,1992, at 4 (expressing similar concerns about public
transit in Chicago).
168. 49 U.S.C. § 5301(d).
169. See Ams. Disabled for Accessible Pub. Transp. ("ADAPT") v. Skinner, 881 F.2d
1184, 1187 (3d Cir. 1989). The statute was originally at 49 U.S.C. § 1612(a).
170. ADAPT, 881 F.2d at 1187 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1612(a)). Today, the statute is
almost identically worded, except that it substitutes "individuals with disabilities" for
"handicapped persons" and makes several other grammatical corrections. See Historical
and Statutory Notes to 49 U.S.C. § 5301 (changes made "to eliminate unnecessary
words").

July 2001]

PUBLIC TRANSIT FOR THE DISABLED

any program or activity receiving Federal
discrimination in 171
financial assistance.
Congress then enacted section 165(b) of the Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1973 (FAHA), which directed that:
projects receiving Federal financial assistance ... shall be planned,

designed, constructed, and operated to allow effective utilization by
elderly and handicapped persons who, by reason of illness, injury,
age, congenital malfunction, or other permanent or temporary
incapacity or disability... are unable without special facilities or
special planning or design to utilize such facilities and services
effectively .... The Secretary shall not approve any program or
project to which this section applies which does not comply with the
provisions of this subsection requiring access to public mass
equipment, and services for elderly or
transportation facilities,
172
persons.
handicapped
To implement these statutory mandates, the federal Department
of Transportation (DOT) promulgated regulations in 1976 requiring
transit systems to make "special efforts in planning public mass
transportation facilities and services that can effectively be utilized by
elderly and handicapped persons."' 73
Two days before the DOT regulations were published, 174
President Ford issued Executive Order 11,914,175 which required the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) (now the
Department

of Health and Human Services) 176 to coordinate

implementation of the policy of nondiscrimination announced in the
Rehabilitation Act.
HEW's guidelines, issued in 1978, required all recipients of
federal funds to make public transportation "readily accessible to and
usable by handicapped persons."' 77 Specifically, HEW required
retrofitting of subways and buses to make those modes of
transportation fully accessible to the disabled. 178
HEW guidelines also discussed the role of paratransit-that is,
transportation provided upon request by a disabled individual rather
171. ADAPT, 881 F.2d at 1187 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)). Today, the statute is
almost identically worded, except that it substitutes the word "disability" for the word
"handicap". See Historical and Statutory Notes to 29 U.S.C. § 794.
172. ADAPT, 881 F.2d at 1187-88 (quoting 23 U.S.C. § 142).
173. 41 Fed. Reg. 18,234 (1976).
174. See ADAPT, 881 F.2d at 1188.
175. 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976).

176. See 20 U.S.C. § 3508.
177. ADAPT, 881 F.2d at 1188.
178. Id.
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than on fixed routes 79 HEW stressed that transit systems should
offer the disabled access to public transit "in the most integrated
setting appropriate"'180 but added that HEW did not construe the
guidelines "to preclude in all circumstances the provision of
specialized services [targeted to the disabled] as a substitute for, or
supplement to, totally accessible services."' 8'
In 1979, DOT promulgated regulations in compliance with the
HEW guidelines. Those regulations mandated across-the-board
alterations to ensure that all transportation facilities were made
accessible to handicapped persons. 182 For example, the DOT
mandated that every bus purchased after July 2, 1979 have a
wheelchair lift, and that at the end of ten years half of all transit
system buses be wheelchair-accessible. 183 The 1979 regulations were
immediately challenged by the American Public Transit Association,
a trade association of public transit systems. 184 In American Public
TransitAssociation (APTA) v. Lewis,185 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit invalidated the regulations. The
court interpreted the Rehabilitation Act's nondiscrimination
requirement to mean that transit systems must take "modest,
affirmative steps to accommodate handicapped persons"'186 and held
that DOT's regulations were not authorized by the statute because
they "require extensive modifications of existing systems and impose
extremely heavy burdens on local transit authorities.' 187 The court
remanded the case to DOT so the agency could determine whether its
188
regulations were authorized by UMTA or FAHA.
In response, DOT promulgated more modest interim regulations
rather than issuing a final set of regulations. 89 The interim
regulations contained two noteworthy provisions.
First, the
regulations contained a "local option" provision allowing transit
systems to choose whether to accommodate the disabled through
179. See ADAPT, 881 F.2d at 1186 n.1 (defining "paratransit"). Paratransit users are
generally served with wheelchair-accessible vans rather than with conventional buses. Id.
180. 43 Fed. Reg. 2132,2138 (1978).

181. ADAPT, 881 F.2d at 1188.
182. 44 Fed. Reg. 31,442 (1979).
183. Id. at 31,478.
184. ADAPT, 881 F.2d at 1188. See also AMERICAN PUBLIC TRANSIT ASSOCIATION,
TRANSIT FACT BOOK 7 (1998) (describing AFTA).
185. 655 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
186. Id. at 1278.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1278-80.
189. See ADAPT, 881 F.2d at 1188-89 (describing interim regulations and Congress's
dissatisfaction with DOT's slow pace).
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making buses more accessible to the disabled, establishing a separate
paratransit system, or using disabled-accessible buses for some areas
and paratransit for others.Y° Second, the interim Regulations
contained a "safe harbor" provision relieving transit systems of their
obligation to serve the disabled as long as they spent three and a half
percent of funds on such services. 191
In December of 1982, Congress enacted the Surface
Transportation Act of 1982 (STAA), which required DOT to issue
regulations establishing minimum criteria for the provision of services
to the disabled. 19 - The primary purpose of STAA was not to "specify
any substantive standard"'193 but to "prod DOT into action following
1 94
the 1981 remand of the regulations in APTA v. Lewis."'
Nevertheless, DOT did not issue final regulations until 1986.195
The regulations maintained the interim regulations' local option
provision, and established minimum service criteria for transit-only
systems (that is, systems that proposed to serve the disabled solely
through fixed-route transit),1 96 paratransit systems, and mixed systems
combining fixed-route transit and paratransit. The minimum service
criteria required, inter alia, that transit service for the disabled be
comparable in hours, days of service, service area, and fares to service
for the non-disabled. 197 In addition, the regulations maintained the
interim regulations' "safe harbor" provision. The safe harbor
provision stated that transit systems were not required to spend more
than 3% of operating costs on service for the disabled, even if, as a
result, they did not meet the DOT's minimum service criteria.1 98
In ADAPT v. Skinner, seven disabled individuals and disability
rights organizations challenged the local option and safe harbor
provisions of the regulations. Plaintiffs argued that the local option
provision was invalid because the law required "mainstreaming" (that
is, that fixed-route buses and trains be accessible to the disabled even
190. See ADAPT, 881 F.2d at 1188.
191. See ADAPT, 881 F.2d at 1188-89.
192 See ADAPT, 881 F.2d at 1189 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1612(d)). The statute is now
codified at 49 U.S.C. § 5310(f), which requires DOT "to prescribe regulations establishing
minimum criteria... [federal aid recipients] shall comply with in providing mass
transportation to elderly individuals and individuals with disabilities."
193. ADAPT, 881 F.2d at 1195 (emphasis omitted).
194. Id. at 1196.
195. See 51 Fed. Reg. 18,994 (1986).
196. A fixed-route transit system is one "on which a vehicle is operated along a
prescribed route according to a fixed schedule." 42 U.S.C. § 12141(3).
197. See ADAPT, 881 F.2d at 1189-90.
198. Id. at 1190.
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in jurisdictions providing paratransit service) and that the safe harbor
provision was arbitrary and capricious. 199 The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit rejected the first argument and endorsed the
second. The court upheld DOT's local option rule, because none of
the relevant statutes (the Rehabilitation Act, UMTA, FAHA and
STAA) expressly required mainstreaming, 20 0 because case law
thereunder had generally rejected mainstreaming,20 1 and because
DOT's local option rule was "adequately supported by record
evidence of the relative costs and benefits." 20 The court also relied
on the doctrine that in "the absence of a clear congressional
mandate... [courts should] defer to an agency's interpretation of the
'20 3
relevant statute in its regulations.
By contrast, the court held that the 3% safe harbor provision was
"arbitrary and capricious"20 4 because "under the safe harbor
provision, cities could deny to the disabled the minimum quality of
service mandated by the Congress with impunity. '20 5 The court
explained that "according to DOT, if the 3% safe harbor were
implemented, cities of less than one million people in which the
transit authorities implemented a paratransit-only system would
virtually never meet all of the applicable service criteria" 206 - a result
that was not contemplated by Congress.20 7 In fact, the 3% safe harbor
violated STAA because that statute required DOT to establish
minimum service criteria, and the safe harbor rule allowed transit
20 8
operators in all but the largest cities to avoid meeting those criteria.
B. Why Pre-ADA Law Was Inadequate
After ADAPT, many transit systems sought to make their buses
available to the disabled; by 1990, 35% of America's buses, and half
of all newly acquired buses, were accessible to the disabled.2 0 9

199. Id. at 1186-87. An arbitrary and capricious regulation violates the federal
Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 706.
200. ADAPT, 881 F.2d at 1191.
201. Id. at 1193-94.

202. Id. at 1198.
203. Id. at 1193.

204. Id. at 1201.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1202-03.
209. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. I, at 24 (1990); Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Civil
Rights of the Handicapped in Transportation: The Americans with DisabilitiesAct and
Related Legislation, 19 TRANSP. L.J. 309,317 (1990).
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Nevertheless, Congress believed that "17 years of experience
with [the Rehabilitation Act] ...have demonstrated the need for

further legislative action in this area. '210 Under the local option rules,
a transit system could comply with DOT regulations solely by making
their buses and trains accessible to the disabled 211 while failing to
meet the needs of the 1.4 million Americans 212 who required
additional assistance to use public transportation. 2 3 For example,
individuals with severe vision impairments cannot use ordinary trains
and buses without assistance if they are traveling in unfamiliar
surroundings or have only recently lost their vision. 214 Similarly,
"chronic fatigue.., a lack of cognitive ability to remember and follow
directions, or a special sensitivity to temperature" 215 may prevent an
individual from traveling to a bus stop.
Conversely, a local government could seek to meet the needs of
the disabled solely through paratransit, but this option also could not
accommodate all disabled transit users. The House Education and
Labor Committee found that paratransit was often inadequate
for the following reasons, among others; the need to make
reservations in advance often conflicts with one's work schedule or
interests in going out to restaurants and the like; the cost of rides
when used frequently is often exorbitant; limitations on time of day
and the number of days that the paratransit operates; waiting time;
restrictions on use by guests and nondisabled companions who are
excluded from accompanying the person with a disability; the
restrictions on eligibility placed
expense to the public agency; and
216
on use by social service agencies.
For example, one disabled witness from Indianapolis testified
that he was forced to rely on that city's paratransit services because
his city had only six buses with wheelchair lifts, and that one day
when he was released from a hospital, the transit agency "called to
say that they could not pick me up even though I had scheduled my
ride three weeks in advance.., there are more than 100 persons on a
210. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, p. IV, at 24.
211. See ADAPT, 881 F.2d at 1191-98 (upholding local option rule allowing local
governments to rely solely on improving fixed-route transit).
212. See Rennert, supra note 17, at 399.
213. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 37 ("Witnesses testified about the need to
pursue a multi-modal approach to ensuring access for people with disabilities which
provides that... paratransit is made accessible for those who cannot use the fixed route
accessible vehicles."); id. at 38 (quoting numerous witnesses).
214. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. I, at 29.
215. Id.
216. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. I, at 38.
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waiting list to utilize this very limited form of accessible public
transportation. ' 217 Congress sought to solve these problems by
enacting the ADA.
C.

The ADA's Requirements

Section 202 of the ADA provides that "no qualified individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from

participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity. 218 Much of Title IL of the ADA 219 clarifies this general
rule by explaining what transit systems must do to avoid
"discrimination" against the disabled.

The ADA's most significant transit-related provisions, Sections
222 and 223,220 require transit systems to provide the disabled with
both accessible fixed route service and paratransit. Section 222
provides that any public entity that purchases or leases a new bus,
rapid rail vehicle, or light rail vehicle, must make the vehicle "readily

accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including
individuals who use wheelchairs. ' 221 However, nothing in Section 222
requires public entities to purchase or lease new vehicles, or even to
provide any transit service at all. Thus, a public entity can avoid
Section 222 by reducing transit service. 222
Section 222 specifically "mandates lifts [for wheelchairs] on every
new public transit bus." 223 The House Committee on Public Works
and Transportation added that

[a]Ithough individuals who use wheelchairs are specifically
referenced, the concept of making a vehicle readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities involves more than
simply making it available to an individual using a wheelchair. For

example.., this section may require vehicles to incorporate nonslip floors for individuals whose disabilities cause balance problems
217. Id.
218. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

219. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et. seq.
220. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12142-43.
221. 42 U.S.C. § 12142(a). DOT later issued detailed guidelines that define what makes
a bus, train, or facility "accessible" to the disabled. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 37.7 and 37.9, 49
C.F.R. pt. 38.
222. See infra notes 273-83 and accompanying text (discussing case law allowing transit
agencies to reduce service).
223. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. I, at 58 (1990) (additional views of John Paul
Hammerschmidt and ten other legislators). However, the obligation to purchase liftequipped buses may be temporarily suspended if such buses are unavailable. See 42
U.S.C. § 12145; 49 C.F.R. § 37.71 (b-g) (setting forth procedures for waiver).
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or specific visual information for the hearing-impaired. 224

Transit systems may not evade ADA requirements by purchasing
used vehicles that are not accessible to the disabled, because a transit

agency may not purchase or lease used buses or trains unless it
"makes demonstrated good faith efforts to purchase or lease a used

vehicle for use on such system that is readily accessible to and usable
by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use
Similarly, transit systems may not evade the ADA by
wheelchairs."
remanufacturing buses or trains, because all remanufactured transit
vehicles must be "to the maximum extent feasible, readily accessible
to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals
who use wheelchairs." 226

Section 223 requires all government agencies operating fixed
route systems to provide paratransit service as a "safety net" for
disabled individuals incapable of using conventional public transit.227
Such service must be "sufficient to provide to [disabled] individuals a
level of service.., comparable to the level of designated public
transportation services provided to individuals without disabilities
using such system. '' 228 Specifically, paratransit systems should have
response times229 and service areas230 comparable to those of fixed

224. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. I, at 27.
225. 42 U.S.C. § 12142(b). See 49 C.F.R. §§ 37.73 (b-d) and 37.81 (b-d) (setting forth

procedures for waiver). The "good faith" provision does not mean that transit providers
may purchase inaccessible vehicles merely because they are less expensive; rather, the
agency must show that it cannot find an accessible vehicle even after a nationwide search.
See 49 C.F.R. § 37.73, App. D. The DOT has stated that "good faith efforts [may] involve

buying fewer accessible buses in preference to more inaccessible buses." Id.
226. 42 U.S.C. § 12142(c)(1). The term remanufacture "is to include changes to the
structure of the vehicle which extend the useful life of the vehicle for five years... [but
not] engine overhaul and the like." 49 C.F.R. § 37.75, app. D. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 37.75(d)
(remanufacturing bus to make it accessible to disabled feasible unless "engineering
analysis demonstrates that including accessibility features required by this part would have
a significant adverse impact on the structural integrity of the vehicle") and 37.83(c)
(establishing same proposition for rail cars and trains). This subsection does not apply to
"historic vehicles." 42 U.S.C. § 12142(c)(2). The National Register of Historic Places
determines whether a vehicle is "historic," 49 C.F.R. § 37.76(d), and if an agency operates
an historic vehicle, it need only make "such modifications to make the vehicle accessible
which do not alter the historic character of such vehicle, in consultation with the National
Register of Historic Places." 49 C.F.R. § 37.76(e). See also 42 U.S.C. § 12148(b)(2) and 49
C.F.R. § 37.83(d-e) (establishing similar rules for historic trains).
227. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.121, app. D.
228. 42 U.S.C. § 12143(a)(1).
229. See 42 U.S.C. § 12143(a)(2) (Paratransit users should have "response time, which is
comparable, to the extent practicable, to the level of designated public transportation
services provided to individuals without disabilities."). DOT regulations provide that
transit systems may require paratransit users to make reservations a day in advance. See
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route service. Paratransit services must be provided to (1) disabled
individuals who are unable, due to their disability, to board, ride or
disembark from buses or trains without the assistance of another
individual (other than the operator of a wheelchair lift or other
boarding assistance device);23' (2) any disabled individual who needs
a wheelchair lift or other boarding assistance device to board, ride or
disembark from any vehicle which is readily accessible to and usable
by individuals with disabilities if the individual wants to travel at a
time when fixed route vehicles with such assistance devices are not
available;2 32 (3) individuals who can travel on a bus or train but
cannot, due to their disability, travel to a bus or train stop;233 and (4)
to persons traveling with disabled individuals eligible for paratransit
service.

23 4

Like Section 222, Section 223 essentially requires state and local
governments to provide comparable transit service for disabled and
non-disabled alike, but does not prohibit governments from reducing
transit service for everyone.2 35 Moreover, government agencies need
not comply with Section 223 if doing so "would impose an undue
financial burden on the [agency]." 236 In such situations, transit
49 C.F.R. § 37.131(b). Paratransit service hours, however, must be as extensive as those of
a transit provider's fixed route service. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.131(e).
230. See 42 U.S.C. § 12143(c)(2) (requiring "the provision of paratransit and special
transportation services required under this section in the service area of each public entity
which operates a fixed route system"). Specifically, a transit agency shall provide service
to any place within 314 of a mile of a bus or train stop in its jurisdiction. See 49 C.F.R.
§ 37.131(a)(1) and (a)(3).
231. See 42 U.S.C. § 12143(c)(A)(i).
232. See 42 U.S.C. § 12143(c)(1)(A)(ii). An individual may be paratransit-eligible for
some bus routes but not for others, depending on whether an accessible bus is available for
a particular bus route. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.123, app. D.
233. See 42 U.S.C. § 12143(c)(1)(A)(iii). See also 49 C.F.R. § 37.123, app. D (Such
disabilities may include, but are not limited to, blindness, chronic fatigue, lack of ability to
follow directions, or unusual temperature sensitivity.).
234. See 42 U.S.C. § 12143(c)(1)(B) and (C). Subsection (B) provides that at least one
individual may always travel with a disabled individual, and Subsection (C) adds that
additional individuals may also do so if space is available. DOT regulations establish that
the one guaranteed companion is in addition to any personal attendant required by a
rider, so that a disabled rider may travel with one personal attendant and one additional
companion. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.123(f)(1). On the other hand, a disabled individual may
not be required to travel with an attendant. 49 C.F.R. § 37.123, app. D.
235. See infra notes 368, 396 and accompanying text (noting that some transit agencies
have reduced overall transit service in order to avoid supplying the disabled with
paratransit services).
236. 42 U.S.C. § 12143(c)(4). The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) may consider
a wide variety of factors in deciding whether to grant or deny a "undue burden" waiver,
including the likelihood of fare increases or service reductions in conventional transit
service that might be caused by the denial of a waiver, the possibility of preventing such

Jly 2001]

PUBLIC TRANSIT FOR THE DISABLED

systems need only provide paratransit services "to the extent that

providing such services would not impose such a [undue] burden." 237

Transit systems must prepare paratransit plans after a public hearing
and public comment,2 8 and submit such plans annually to DOT for its
approvalP

9

Should DOT find that a plan does not satisfy ADA

requirements, it must disapprove the plan, and the transit system
must submit a modified plan. 240 A transit system must comply with its
own paratransit plan.241
Sections 222 and 223 are the most widely applicable provisions of
the ADA because fixed-route bus systems serve more riders than rail
systems or demand-responsive service. 242 ADA provisions governing
demand-responsive systems, 243 new transit facilities (such as rail
stations and bus terminals), 2 4 and rail systems echo Sections 222 and
223. For example, the ADA requires demand-responsive systems to
make new vehicles accessible to the disabled, 245 and requires new

outcomes through efficiencies or coordination of efforts with other transit providers, the
resources available for paratransit, current levels of paratransit and fixed-route service,
and any other unique circumstances that may be relevant. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.155(a).
237. Id. However, the FTA may require public agencies to provide a minimal level of
paratransit service (e.g., service along a transit agency's most popular routes during peak
hours of service) even if such service would be unduly burdensome. See 49 C.F.R. §
37.153(c)(2).
238. See 42 U.S.C. § 12143(c)(6). See also 49 C.F.R. § 37.139 (describing appropriate
contents of paratransit plans).
239. See 42 U.S.C. § 12143(c)(7) and (d)(1).
240. See 42 U.S.C. § 12143(d).
241. See 42 U.S.C. § 12143(e).
242. See TRANSIT FACT BOOK, supra note 184, at 110-123 (On an average weekday
Americans take 16 million fixed-route bus trips, as opposed to 341,000 demand-response
trips and about 8 million heavy and light rail trips.); id. at 119 (only 11 American metro
areas have subway or similar rail service); id. at 121 (only 21 American metro areas have
subway or similar rail service, some of whom have heavy rail service as well or have
downtown-only service); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 94 (1990) (pointing out limited
scope of demand responsive service other than paratransit).
243. See 42 U.S.C. § 12141(1) (Demand-responsive system is "any system of
providing ...public transportation that is not a fixed route system.") Demand-responsive
systems other than paratransit are generally limited to small towns and rural areas. See
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 94.
244. DOT regulations define facilities as "buildings, structures, sites, complexes,
equipment, roads, walks, passageways, parking lots, or any other real or personal
property" used to provide public transit. 49 C.F.R. § 37.3.
245. See 42 U.S.C. § 12144. This requirement does not apply, however, if a demandresponsive transit "system, when viewed in its entirety, provides a level of service to such
individuals equivalent to the level of service such system provides to individuals without
disabilities." Id.
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transit facilities246 and alterations of existing facilities2 47 to be
accessible to the disabled.
The ADA also requires that rail systems go beyond merely
improving new or altered facilities. Specifically, it requires that "key"
rail stations (such as stations with high ridership, end-of-the-line
stations, and stations at which riders likely to transfer between rail
lines or between buses and trains)2 48 be made accessible to the
disabled within three years, 249 and that all rail systems operating
multi-car trains have "at least 1 vehicle per train that is accessible to
individuals with disabilities.., as soon as practicable but in no event
later than the last day of the 5-year period beginning on the effective
S°
date of this section. '2
Title II of the ADA (which encompasses the public
transportation provisions discussed above) provides that the remedies
set forth in the Rehabilitation Act251 shall govern actions involving
discrimination relating to government programs2 52 The House
Judiciary Committee explained that the ADA, like the Rehabilitation
Act, provides for a private right of action.253
Finally, the ADA required the DOT to issue regulations
implementing its transit-related provisions,254 which the DOT did in
1991.2 5 In addition to interpreting some of the ADA provisions
addressed above,2 56 DOT regulations addressed a wide variety of

issues not directly addressed by the ADA.
regulations:

For example, DOT

246. See 42 U.S.C. § 12146.
247. See 42 U.S.C. § 12147(a).
248. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. I, at 32; 49 C.F.R. § 37.47(b) (listing criteria
relevant to definition of key stations).
249. See 42 U.S.C. § 12147(b)(2)(A). This deadline may be extended, however, for
"extraordinary expensive structural changes." 42 U.S.C. § 12147(b)(2)(B) (allowing
extensions for up to 30 years as long as 2/3 of key stations accessible within 20 years).
250. 42 U.S.C. § 12148(b)(1).
251. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
252. 42 U.S.C. § 12133 ("The remedies, procedures and rights set forth in section 505 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794(a)) shall be the remedies, procedures, and
rights this title provides to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in
violation of section 202 [42 U.S.C. § 12132].").
253. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 52. ADA plaintiffs, however, are typically
limited to injunctive relief rather than damages. See Midgett v. Tri-County Transp. Dist.,
74 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1018 (D. Or. 1999) (Damages may be awarded only if transit system
engaged in intentional discrimination or deliberate indifference to plaintiff's rights.).
254. See 42 U.S.C. § 12149(a).
255. See 49 C.F.R. pts. 37, 38.
256. See supra notes 220-54 and accompanying text.
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* require that vehicles already accessible to the disabled remain
accessiblez 57 and gave specific directions as to how wheelchair lifts
8
should be maintained;-2
• provide that paratransit fares may not exceed twice the fixedroute fare for a comparable ride; 259

* prohibit paratransit providers from imposing restrictions on
priorities based on an individual's trip purpose;260
* require that certain major bus stops should be announced for
disabled passengers;261
* provides that where numerous bus routes serve one bus stop,
transit systems shall provide means by which visually impaired
262
individuals may identify the proper vehicle to enter;
to travel with
* require that disabled passengers be allowed
264
portable oxygen supplies263 and service animals;
* require that disabled passengers be provided with adequate
information about public transportation; 265
* require that certain bus and train seats be designated as priority
seating for the disabled;266 and
267
* set forth means of administrative enforcement of the ADA.
In addition to issuing regulations, DOT simultaneously issued
guidelines interpreting those regulations. 268 Parts of these guidelines
merely restate the regulations, but others are less obviously based on
the ADA or the regulations. For example, the guidelines clarify that
paratransit service may be either door-to-door or curb-to-curb and
that paratransit service may therefore take an individual to an
accessible transit stop rather than to an ultimate destination,2 69 and
interpret the nondiscrimination requirement of the ADA to mean
that obnoxious conduct associated with a disability does not justify

257. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.161.
258. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.163-65.
259. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.131(c).
260. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.131(d). In fact, providers should not even ask the purpose of a
trip. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.131, app. D.
261. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.167.
262. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.167(c). DOT has declined to prescribe specific means for such
identification. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.167, app. D.
263. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.167(a).
264. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.167(d).
265. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.167(f).
266. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.167(j).
267. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.11.
268. See 49 C.F.R. pt. 37, app. D.
269. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.123, app. D.
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exclusion of disabled passengers unless it represents a direct threat to
other riders.270
D. ADA Case Law

Case law interpreting the ADA's public transportation
provisions has been quite sparse, perhaps because many disputes
under the ADA settle.271 Nevertheless, a few decisions have
interpreted those provisions, and will be discussed below.
(1) Service Reductions

Hassanv. Slater7z2 is arguably the most far-reaching case decided
under the ADA's transit-related provisions. In Hassan, a disabled
commuter alleged that a transit agency's decision to close a nearby
rail station27 3 violated the ADA. Because of the station's closure, the
nearest station would be four miles from the plaintiff's home-too far
for plaintiff to walk, and too far for plaintiff to afford a taxicab ride to
the station on a regular basis. 274
The court denied plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction,
holding, inter alia, that he had "not established a likelihood of success
on the merits." 275 The court explained that "[i]t does not appear that
the ADA requires the [transit system] to keep all of its stations
open.., rather, the ADA only requires that [it] make new stations
and its designated key stations fully accessible to and usable by
people with disabilities. 2 76 The transit agency's decision to close a
station did not breach the latter requirement, because "the station
277
closing affects all potential users, not merely disabled users."

270. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.5, app. D.
271. See, e.g., Collins v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 69 F. Supp. 2d 701 (E.D. Pa. 1999)
(awarding attorneys' fees to plaintiffs who settled ADA dispute); Neff v. Via Metro.
Transit Auth., 179 F.R.D. 585 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (upholding settlement of ADA action);
James v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. Civ. A. 93-CV-5538, 1997 WL 698035 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
4, 1997) (awarding attorneys' fees to plaintiffs who settled ADA dispute). Cf Bacal v.
S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. Civ. A. 94-6497, 1998 WL 324907 (E.D. Pa. June 3, 1998)
(interpreting ADA consent decree).
272. 41 F. Supp. 2d 343 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), affd, 199 F.3d 1322 (2d Cir. 1999) (table).
273. The station was a commuter rail station rather than a light or heavy rail station;
however, commuter rail stations are subject to ADA provisions analogous to those
governing other forms of public transit. See 42 U.S.C. § 12161 et. seq.
274. Hassan,41 F. Supp. 2d at 346. The court did not mention whether the station was
served by buses.

275. Id. at 350.
276. Id. at 351.
277. Id.
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The Hassan court could simply have stated that because the
station at issue was not a new facility or a "key station,"278 the ADA
was irrelevant. Instead, the Hassan court apparently went out of its
way to point out that a transit system has a right to terminate service
as long as it harms disabled and nondisabled transit users equally-a
ruling that would seem to apply to buses and key stations, as well as
to non-key stations.
The Hassan court's view is not unique: another district court has
noted that "the ADA does not require public transit systems to
provide better service to disabled passengers than is provided to other
passengers, only comparable service." 279 Similarly, the DOT has
noted that "the ADA does not attempt to meet all the transportation
needs of individuals with disabilities... the ADA is intended simply
to provide to individuals with disabilities the same mass
transportation service opportunities everyone else gets, whether they
be good, bad or mediocre." 280
This view is not directly foreclosed by the text of the ADA,
which appears to focus on equal treatment between disabled and nondisabled transit users. For example, the ADA provides that if a
government chooses to finance public transit, transit vehicles must be
made accessible to the disabled, 281 and paratransit service must be
"comparable to the level of designated public transportation services
provided to individuals without disabilities. ' "M But as the Hassan
court pointed out, the ADA does not explicitly require state and local
governments to provide transit service to anyone, nor does it state
how much transit service to provide to individuals without disabilities.
Thus, a local government can, under Hassan, comply with the ADA
by eliminating public transportation entirely-hardly a result
consistent with the ADA's goal of "welcom[ing] individuals with
disabilities fully into the mainstream of American society... [by
ensuring that] this country can continue to make progress in
providing much needed transit services for individuals with
disabilities. '' 283 Obviously, the ADA's purpose is not satisfied when
transit service is reduced rather than increased.
278. Id. (noting that station at issue was not designated as key station).
279. Midgett v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist., 74 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1012 (D. Or.

1999).
280. 56 Fed. Reg. 45584, 45601 (1991) (explaining 49 C.F.R. § 37.123, setting forth
standards for ADA paratransit eligibility).

281. 42 U.S.C. § 12142(a).
282. 42 U.S.C. § 12143(a)(1).
283. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. I, at 24 (1990).
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If politically powerful majorities used public transit, the majority
could not reduce transportation to the disabled without reducing
transportation for itself. But in reality, transit users are a
Transit riders are
disorganized, dispossessed minority.
4
disproportionately poor,2 and have no lobby that makes political
contributions (unlike auto- and highway-related interests) 85 Not
surprisingly, politicians use public transit as a whipping boy whenever
federal highway grants to state and local
money is scarce:
governments increased by 150% between 1980 and 1999,286 while
public transit grants nosedived in real terms, increasing by only 27%
while the cost of living nearly doubled2 7 And over the long term, as
noted above, transit-dependent Americans have fewer opportunities
than they once did because of the movement of jobs to transit-free
suburbia. 288
So by limiting transit service to the disabled to the same level as
transit service to everyone else, the Hassan court essentially
interpreted the ADA to mean that one group of second-class citizens
(the disabled) is equal to another group of second-class citizens (other
transit-dependent Americans) -hardly a result consistent with the
ADA's ideals. It follows that Hassan, although consistent with the

ADA's text, is hardly consistent with its egalitarian goals.
(2) Service Slip-Ups

Most ADA claims, by contrast, have involved narrow issues and
been decided upon narrow grounds. For example, in Midgett v. TiCounty TransportationDistrict,289 a wheelchair user contended that
284. See TRANSIT FACr BOOK, supra note 184, at 13-14 (in 1992, 27% of transit trips
taken by persons with family incomes below $15,000); 1999 ABSTRACr, supra note 2, at
478 (about 13% of all Americans had family incomes below $15,000). The same is true of
the disabled. See Survey Program,supra note 49 (29% of the disabled live in poverty, as
opposed to 10% of non-disabled, and only 16% of disabled live in households earning
over $50,000 annually, as opposed to 39% of non-disabled.).
Politics
Website,
Center
for
Responsive
examined
the
285. I
http://www.opensecrets.org (last visited July 9, 2000), and could find no public transitrelated Political Action Committee. By contrast, committees affiliated with the road
construction, automobile, and homebuilding industries donated millions of dollars to
candidates. Id.
286. See 1999 ABSTRACr, supra note 2, at 314 (highway spending increased from $9.2
billion to $22.7 billion).
287. Id. at 314 (transit spending increased by 27%, from $3.12 billion to $3.94 billion),
882 (consumer price index doubled between 1980 and 1998). I note, however, that transit
spending has increased in recent years. See Plungis, supra note 82..
288. See supra notes 25-47 and accompanying text (discussing large number of jobs and
other opportunities inaccessible without car in suburbs and small cities).
289. 74 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Or. 1999).
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"he would like to travel to work by bus, but because of [a local transit
agency's] alleged failure to adequately train its bus operators and
failure to maintain the wheelchair lifts" '290 his mobility was impeded in
violation of the ADA. On one cold morning, a bus stopped for
plaintiff but the bus's wheelchair lift was inoperable due to cold
weather. 291 That very same day, plaintiff was unable to board two
other buses due to similar maintenance problems. 292 Plaintiff
accordingly sought a preliminary injunction requiring "a laundry list
of augmented practices" 293 including, inter alia, improved data
collection, improved bus driver training, a media outreach program to
increase awareness among bus riders of lift access and complaint
procedures, a backup system to ensure against lift failure in cold
weather, a dedicated customer service line for lift users, and revised
294
scheduling procedures to allow sufficient time for inspections.
The court refused plaintiffs request for injunctive relief, for two
reasons. First, the court found that "the desired corrective action has
already been taken. '295
For example, the transit agency's
maintenance department had recently begun using a new hydraulic
fluid that enabled its wheelchair lifts to operate more consistently in
cold weather. 296 Second, although "plaintiff points to occasional lift
problems he and other wheelchair passengers have encountered,
when viewed in the larger context of [the] entire fixed-route
system.., the occasional lift problems do not violate the ADA or its
implementing regulations."297
Thus, Midgett holds that occasional inaccessibility problems, as
opposed to a pattern of incompetence, do not violate the ADA if a
transit agency has taken steps to eliminate the problem; it is not clear
from Midgett whether plaintiff's problems with wheelchair lifts would
have been actionable had the transit authority did nothing. As a
practical matter, Midgett suggests that the courts will not meddle in a

290. Id. at 1010.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1014.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1018. In fact, the court stated that it would not award costs to the victorious
defendant because plaintiff's complaints caused "valuable and beneficial improvements in
[the] fixed-route bus system, particularly in the areas of accessibility, training, equipment
and awareness... [thus] plaintiff's lawsuit ultimately benefited both the disabled and nondisabled members of the community." Id. at 1019.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1018.
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transit system's management merely because service breaks down
occasionally.
But other cases, such as James v. PeterPan TransitManagement,
Inc.,298 hold that service breakdowns may violate the ADA if they are
sufficiently egregious. In James, a wheelchair-using plaintiff claimed
that she had "experienced numerous problems with CAT Connector
[a local demand-response system] due to inoperable CAT Connector
'299
wheelchair lifts and improperly trained CAT Connector drivers.
After describing plaintiffs complaint, the court enumerated nineteen
separate examples of CAT Connector incompetence 3°0
The court denied defendants' 301 summary judgment motion
because plaintiff had submitted evidence that the bus service had
repeatedly failed to check wheelchair lifts to determine whether they
were operable (which in turn caused lifts to become inoperable),
failed to promptly repair vehicles with defective lifts, and did not train
drivers to operate lifts. 302 Thus, a issue of fact requiring trial existed
as to whether defendants "adequately maintained and repaired its
lifts and adequately trained its employees
CAT Connector wheelchair
'303
to operate the lifts.
Similarly, Cupolo v. Bay Area Rapid Transit3°4 granted a
preliminary injunction requiring a transit agency to repair its
elevators. The Cupolo plaintiffs, a class of individuals with mobility
disabilities, alleged that they were repeatedly unable to use the
elevators at a transit agency's key rail stations. For example, in one
fourteen-month period there were 76 separate incidents in which
passengers were trapped in elevators. 305 The court found that the
'30 6
transit agency's own documents indicated "widespread problems,
that the "much of the [agency's] maintenance work has been fairly
cursory, '' 30 7 that the agency "has had difficulty obtaining replacement
parts in a timely manner... [which] has exacerbated problems with
298. No. 5:97-CV-747-BO-1, 1999 WL 735173 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 20,1999).
299. Id. at *2.
300. Id. at *4.
301. The defendants were a city and a private contractor hired to provide demand
response service by the city. Although the contractor provided the service, the city was
held vicariously liable for the contractor's conduct. Id. at *9 (public entity liable under
ADA for independent contractor's violations as well as those of its employees).
302. Id. at *6-7.
303. Id. at *7.
304. 5 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
305. Id. at 1080.
306. Id. at 1081.
307. Id.
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repairing elevators speedily," 308 and that the agency's "inability to
perform through preventive maintenance... has probably been a

significant factor behind the problems encountered by class
members. '30 9 In sum, the transit agency's problems constituted "a
pattern of unreliable elevator service that cannot310 accurately be
characterized as isolated or temporary interruptions.
Because the ADA requires transit systems to make key rail
stations accessible to disabled persons, and unreliable elevator service
"resulted in the denial of access to [trains] to individuals with mobility
disabilities, '31 ' the court found that plaintiffs had demonstrated a
strong likelihood of success on their ADA claim. The court further
found that the transit agency's plan to repair its elevators did not
render the suit moot, because many of the elevators' problems had
not been resolved. 312 The court accordingly granted a preliminary
injunction requiring that the elevators in the transit agency's key
3 13
stations be repaired.
Despite their varying results, James and Cupolo are consistent
with Midgett: the former cases hold that a transit agency violates the
ADA through consistently inadequate service, while the latter case
holds that isolated service problems do not violate that statute.
(3) EstablishingDisability
In Hamlyn v. Rock Island County Metropolitan Mass Transit
District,314 the court made it clear that a person who is "disabled" for
other ADA-related purposes is also "disabled" for purposes of the
ADA's public transit provisions, and that all disabled persons are
entitled to equal treatment regardless of the cause of their disability.
The Hamlyn plaintiff, who suffered from AIDS, sought to be
included in a county program reducing bus fares for disabled

308. Id.
309. Id. at 1082.
310. Id. at 1083.

311. Id.
312. Id. at 1084-85.
313. Id. at 1085-86. The parties eventually reached a settlement requiring the agency to
rehabilitate or replace all elevators and escalators in key stations over the next
three or four years and promptly fix broken elevators and maintain them in good
working order, as well as maintaining the sanitary conditions of the elevators...
increas[ing] surveillance of the elevators to reduce incidence of vandalism and
urination... [and improve the accessibility of other facilities and equipment].
Mattie C. Condray, Recent Developments in Public TransportationLaw, 30 URB. LAW.
1091, 1094 (1998).
314. 986 F. Supp. 1126 (C.D. Ill. 1997).
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passengers. 315 The program's application form, however, stated:
"WHO DOES NOT QUALIFY: A. Applicants whose sole disability
is... AIDS. ' 316 The court held that because AIDS is a disability
under the ADA,317 and the ADA bars discrimination by reason of
disability, 318 the ADA's language barred the transit agency from
excluding persons disabled by AIDS. 319 Thus, Hamlyn stands for the
proposition that just as a transit agency cannot discriminate against
the disabled generally, it also may not discriminate against persons
with one particular type of disability-a result clearly supported by
the ADA's provision that "no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability... be subject to discrimination by
any [public] entity."320
The case of Weinreich v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transit Authority321 addressed a different eligibility issue: whether a
plaintiff can be required to pay to prove his disability. Between 1982
and 1992, the Weinreich plaintiff participated in a transit agency's
reduced fare program.322 In 1992, the transit agency promulgated a
rule requiring disabled participants to provide medical information
recertifying that they are disabled. 323 In 1993, plaintiff sought an
exemption from this rule on the ground that he could not afford to
pay a doctor to recertify his condition 3 24 The transit agency refused
to grant an exemption, and refused to renew plaintiff's eligibility for
the program. 325 Plaintiff then filed suit326 under the ADA, asserting
that the ADA mandated "reasonable modifications whenever a state
imposes a requirement that prevents qualified disabled people from
having 'meaningful access' to a state-provided benefit. ' 327 The court

315. Id. at 1129.
316. Id. at 1129-30.
317. Id. at 1130 (citing ADA legislative history, regulations, and cases). This conclusion
was confirmed by the Supreme Court and expanded to encompass asymptomatic HIVcarrier status in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
318. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
319. Hamlyn, 986 F. Supp. at 1130.
320. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
321. 114 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 1997).
322. Id. at 978.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Ironically, the indigent plaintiff was represented by an attorney from the highly
prestigious law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher, and Flom. See id. at 977 (naming
counsel); In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735,749 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),
affd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986) (describing Skadden, Arps as "prestigious").
327. Weinreich, 114 F.3d at 979.

July 2001]

PUBLIC TRANSIT FOR THE DISABLED

disagreed, holding that plaintiff's lack of access to the reduced fare
program was based not upon his disability, but upon his failure to
prove his disability (and in particular upon his poverty, which
prevented him from proving disability). 328 In other words, the ADA
bars discrimination due to disability, but does not bar transit systems
from imposing fees that adversely affect the poorest among the
This rule, although seemingly hard-hearted, seems
disabled.
consistent with the ADA. That statute apparently contemplates that
transit authorities may on occasion charge fares unrelated to ability to
pay; for example, DOT regulations authorize transit systems to
329
charge more for paratransit than for conventional bus service.
(4) Alterationsof Facilities
Two separate ADA provisions provide that if a public transit or
commuter rail agency alters its facilities, such alterations must, "to the
maximum extent feasible... [be] readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities. '330 The case of Molloy v. Metropolitan
TransitAuthority331 applied this rule to a commuter railroad's attempt
to automate ticket sales at a commuter rail station.
In Molloy, a group of individuals and organizations representing
the interests of blind and visually impaired riders challenged the
railroad's decision to remove ticket clerks from numerous commuter
rail stations, and to substitute ticket vending machines at a majority of
those stations.332 Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against the
staff reduction plans, and the railroad argued in response that the
ADA was inapplicable because no "alterations" to its facilities
occurred.

333

The court separately addressed the removal of the ticket clerks
and the installation of the vending machines. As to the first issue, the
court held that such staffing changes did not constitute "alterations"
within the meaning of the ADA, for three reasons. First, the
language of the ADA (which refers to "alterations" to stations or

328. Id.
329. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.131(c).
330. 42 U.S.C. § 12147(a) (alterations of fixed route services' facilities); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12162(e)(2)(B)(i) (alterations of commuter and inter city rail stations). See also 42
U.S.C. § 12147(b) (key rapid and light rail stations must be accessible to the disabled); 42
U.S.C. § 12162(a) (new commuter or intercity rail stations, existing intercity rail stations,
and key commuter rail stations must be similarly accessible).
331. 94 F.3d 808 (2d Cir. 1996).
332- Id. at 810.
333. Id. at 812.
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facilities) 334 inherently suggests a physical alteration to a structure
rather than a change in personnel. 335 Second, DOT regulations
interpreting the ADA support this view, because the regulations list
numerous examples of "alterations," all of which involve physical
changes to facilities rather than personnel changes. 336 Third, the
ticket clerks only worked at the station until 1 PM. So if the removal
of ticket clerks constitutes an "alteration," "every day at one o'clock
337
the station [would be] altered in contravention of the statute" obviously an absurd result.
By contrast, the installation of ticket vending machines was
clearly an "alteration" to the station, because it was a physical change
3 38
that would require additional wiring and communications lines.
The railroad argued that the installation of the machines was not an
alteration because the alterations, like such primitive changes as the
installation of a bench, could be removed. The court disagreed,
explaining: "[i]t is easy to imagine, however, how the installation of a
bench in a station could block an otherwise wheelchair-accessible
'339
path, or otherwise render a station less accessible to the disabled.
The court nevertheless declined to grant an injunction because
plaintiffs could purchase tickets through other means and would thus
not be irreparably harmed by the installation of the machines? 40
Molloy appears to be consistent with the ADA's language, in
that it defines "alterations" to "facilities" as physical alterations
rather than other changes affecting the quality of service. As the
court pointed out, any other holding would have led to bizarre results.
(5) Paratransit
Cases under the paratransit provisions of the ADA have been
decided upon the narrowest of grounds. In O'Connor v. Metro

334. 42 U.S.C. § 12147(a) (referring to "alterations of an existing facility or part
thereof"); 42 U.S.C. § 12162(e)(2)(B)(i) (referring to "alterations of an existing station or
part thereof").
335. See Molloy, 94 F.3d at 811.
336. Id. at 811-12.
337. Id. at 812.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 813. The court was rather vague as to whether plaintiffs' claim could succeed
on the merits. The court explained that although the machines were not fully accessible to
visually impaired riders, it was not yet clear whether the machines were accessible "to the
maximum extent feasible" as required by the ADA. Id. at 812-13. Cf. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12147(a) (Altered facilities need only be accessible to the disabled to maximum extent
feasible.).
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Ride,341 a disabled couple sued a transit provider for personal injuries
suffered after a paratransit driver left them at the end of a driveway
instead of helping them into a friend's house. 342 The husband sought
to push his wheelchair-using wife into the friend's doorway, but
instead fell down the latter's stairs, causing both husband and wife to
be injured.3 43 Plaintiffs then sued the transit agency under, among
other grounds, the ADA.
The transit system argued that the ADA did not require it to
provide plaintiffs with door-to-door service, because the ADA and
DOT regulations require only "origin-to-destination" service.344 The
court held that it did not need to define the scope of the term "origin"[b]ecause Defendants incorporated
to-destination," reasoning:
door-through-door service in the paratransit plan they proposed to
the Department of Transportation, they may be liable under the
ADA." 345 This ruling was based upon Section 223(e)(4) of the ADA,
which provides that the term "discrimination" includes the failure "to
provide paratransit or other special transportation services in
accordance with the plan or modified plan the public entity submitted
to [DOT]. ' 346 In other words, a transit agency must follow the
paratransit plan it submits to the DOT-even if that plan is more
ambitious than the ADA would otherwise require. O'Connor
the statute, and therefore
appears to follow the plain meaning of
347
should not be particularly controversial.
State courts as well as federal courts have interpreted the ADA's
paratransit provisions. In Sells v. New Jersey Transit Corp.,348 the
court upheld a state transit agency's decision to deny paratransit
services to a mentally retarded plaintiff. Plaintiff applied for
paratransit service on two separate grounds.
341. 87 F. Supp. 2d 894 (D. Minn. 2000).
342. Id. at 896.

343. Id.
344. Id. at 900 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 37.129).
345. Id.

346. 42 U.S.C. § 12143(e)(4).
347. In another section of its opinion, the O'Connor court also suggested that
defendants violated the Rehabilitation Act by failing to provide door-to-door service,
stating that paratransit's
purpose is to ensure the safety of disabled persons who "by reason of" their
disabilities require special assistance to get around safely. Door-to-door service
is one component of that assistance, and denial of it, if proved to a jury, is the
precise type of behavior that the Rehab Act is enacted to prevent.
O'Connor,87 F. Supp. 2d at 899. It is not clear, however, whether the court would have so
held had the agency not promised such service in its transit plan.
348. 689 A.2d 1386 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
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First, plaintiff claimed that he was generally unable to use fixedhe
route transit.349 But plaintiff himself testified at a hearing that '35
"was still sometimes using regular fixed route bus service. 0
Because the evidence showed that plaintiff rode ordinary buses, the
351
court rejected his claim that he could not do so.
Plaintiff also claimed that even if he was generally able to use
fixed-route service, he was no longer able to safely walk from his
residence to the nearest bus stop for the route he used to get to work,
because the nearest bus stop was three miles away, and he could no
longer cut through a field that he had previously been able to cut
across.352 The state agency disagreed, finding that plaintiff in fact
lived only half a mile from the bus stop, and because (despite the
absence of sidewalks on his route) there was a grass median that he
could use 3 53 The court affirmed without much discussion, stating that
the state agency's findings "that the expressed dangers were less
severe than originally described and that the actual distance was less
than the original calculation ... have ample support inthe record.

'354

Sells stands for the proposition that a disabled person (other than
one with a walking-related disability) is not entitled to paratransit
merely because he cannot conveniently or pleasurably travel to a bus
stop-for example, if he has to walk 1/2 mile on a street without
sidewalks. Rather, the bus stop must be virtually impossible to reach.
This view is probably consistent with the DOT's regulations, which
provide that a person is ineligible for paratransit only when "a
reasonable person with the impairment-related condition in question
would be deterred from making the trip." 355 Nevertheless, Sells
reduces the mobility of the ambulatory disabled, because unfavorable
conditions such as the absence of sidewalks are likely to ensure that
some individuals will walk to a bus stop only if absolutely
6
necessary.35
The case of Pfister v. City of Madison357 was far simpler. In
Pfister, plaintiff appealed a city's denial of her application for
paratransit service, on the ground that her impaired vision, mobility
349. Id. at 1391.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 1392.
355. Id. at 1391-92 (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 37.123, app. D).
356. Cf.H. Eric Schockman, MunicipalMeasures Offer Opportunitiesto Aid City, L.A.
DAILY NEWS, Oct. 25,1998, at V3 (improved sidewalks increase mobility of disabled).
357. 1995 WL 640599 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 2,1995) (unpublished decision).
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impairments and migraine headaches required her to use such service.
The court agreed with the city's decision, based on "testimony from a
paratransit driver that on several occasions [plaintiff] had asked to be
dropped off at one location and would then make her way to her
ultimate destination on her own, and that this involved traveling
several blocks. '358 Such testimony established that plaintiff was
359
capable of walking to a bus stop and thus did not need paratransit.
The Pfister court's dictum may be more noteworthy than its
holding. In response to the city's argument that many people with
impairments similar to plaintiff's disabilities rode fixed-route buses,
the court responded: "it is irrelevant what other riders do, since the
question is whether [plaintiff] is prevented from- traveling to a
boarding location. '360 Thus, Pfister suggests that a plaintiff's
eligibility for paratransit should be determined solely by reference to
plaintiff's own capacities, as opposed to those of other persons with
similar problems.
(6) Damages

In addition to addressing when injunctive relief is appropriate for
minor service breakdowns, the Midgett court addressed the question

of when damages were an appropriate remedy for violations of the
ADA's public transit provisions. Specifically, that court held that
"compensatory damages are not available under Title II of the ADA
absent a showing of discriminatory intent or, at a minimum,
deliberate indifference.1 361 Because no evidence of discriminatory

358. Id. at *2.
359. Id.

360. Id.
361. Midgett v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist., 74 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1018 (D. Or.
1999). There is a great deal of non-transit case law addressing the question of when
compensatory damages are appropriate for unintentional discrimination under the ADA.
See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1998) (Intentional
discrimination must be shown in order to recover compensatory damages under Title II of
the ADA.); Wood v. President & Trs. of Spring Hill Coll., 978 F.2d 1214, 1219-20 (11th
Cir. 1992) (same); Tayofa v. Bobroff, 865 F. Supp. 742, 749-50 (D.N.M. 1994) (stating that
courts have generally held that intentional discrimination a prerequisite to damages under
42 U.S.C. § 12133), affd mem., 74 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 1996); Tyler v. City of Manhattan,
849 F. Supp. 1442, 1444-45 (D. Kan. 1994) (holding that the plaintiff could not recover
compensatory damages because he did not allege that intentional discrimination caused
his emotional distress, mental anguish and humiliation). But see Ferguson, 157 F.3d at
676-80 (Tashima, J., dissenting) (arguing that Title II does not require plaintiffs to prove
intentional discrimination); Tyler, 118 F.3d at 1406 (Jenkins, J., dissenting) (same). For a
discussion of the different standards courts have used to determine if an act is
"intentional," see Leonard J. Augustine, Jr., Disabling the Relationship Between
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intent was presented in Midgett, the court granted summary judgment
as to plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages.
I. The ADA: Inadequate or Counterproductive?
A.

At Best Inadequate...

The purpose of the ADA is to provide mobility to the disabled 62
But the ADA's requirements (at least under current case law) are
inadequate to achieve this goal.
The ADA requires that most of the same buses and trains that
are available to the general public be made accessible to the disabled
as well. 363 And transit systems have to some extent met this narrow
goal.364 But the ADA does not state how much service must be
provided either to the disabled or to the general public. As a result,
courts have suggested that disabled transit users may receive minimal
service as long as other riders are similarly immobilized. For
example, the Midgett court wrote that "the ADA does not require
public transit systems to provide better service to disabled passengers
'365
than is provided to other passengers, only comparable service.
Similarly, the Hassan court wrote that the ADA does not prohibit
major reductions in service (such as the closing of a train station) as
long as the cutback "affects all potential users, not merely disabled
users. 366
It logically follows that a government may meet its obligations
under the ADA by reducing rather than increasing transit service.
For example, suppose county X does not want to go to the expense of
providing transit service to the disabled. It can comply with the ADA
and cut costs by refusing to provide transit service for anyone, as

Intentional Discriminationand Compensatory Damages Under Title II of the Americans
with DisabilitiesAct, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 592 (1998).

362. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. I, at 24 (1990) (purpose of ADA to bring disabled
"fully into the mainstream of American society").
363. See 42 U.S.C. § 12142(a) (Newly purchased or leased buses and rail vehicles must
be accessible to disabled.); 42 U.S.C. § 12143 (Disabled persons incapable of using
conventional public transit must be provided with paratransit service.).
364. See, e.g., Dan Hartzell, Tentative LANTA Workers Pact Awaiting Ratification By
Union, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Mar. 24, 2000, at B3 (By 2001, 50 of 70 Allentown,

Pa. buses will be accessible to disabled.).
365. 74 F. Supp. 2d at 1012.
366. 41 F. Supp. 2d at 351.
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many municipalities have in fact done 3 67 For example, in Tulsa,

Oklahoma, the city council voted first to eliminate, and later to
drastically limit, a bus route from suburban Sand Springs to
downtown Tulsa because paratransit for Sand Springs would368have
cost at least two and a half times the cost of fixed-route service.

Such policies are by no means politically impossible or even
infrequent. Transit-dependent Americans are a small minority of the
electorate, 369 are disproportionately

low-income,370

and, unlike

highway users, are supported by no significant lobby that can make
campaign contributions to candidates. 371 As a result, transit has had
far less political support than automobiles and highways. While
highway spending has dramatically increased over time no matter

372
how tight the fiscal constraints affecting the rest of government,

transit spending has gone up and down depending on the strength of
federal, state and municipal finances. For example, governmental
support for public transit operating expenses 373 actually decreased by
about 20% in real terms between 1990 (the year of the ADA's
375
enactment) 374 and 1996.
The ADA apparently does not require that disabled transit users
be made equal to the auto-using majority: instead, it requires only

367. See supra notes 27-47 and accompanying text (describing inadequacy of transit
service in most suburbs and small cities); infra notes 369 and 396-97 and accompanying
text.
368. See Bill Swindell, Sand Springs Again Will Receive Bus Service, TULSA WORLD,
Feb. 15, 1997, at All. The service was limited to morning and evening rush hour due to
concerns over the cost of providing paratransit for all-day service. Id.
369. See 1999 ABSTRACr, supra note 2, at 643 (over 90% of households own cars).
370. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
371. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
372- See 1999 ABSTRACr, supra note 2, at 314 (highway spending increased by 150%
between 1980 and 1999, from $9.2 billion to $22.7 billion).
373. Operating expenses include the costs of operating and maintaining existing
vehicles, such as employee benefits, tires, fuels, utilities, and insurance. See TRANSIT
FAcr BOOK, supra note 184, at 57-58. By contrast, government has been more generous
with capital costs (which include the costs of new facilities and construction). Id. at 38-39,
46-47. Over 2/3 of capital spending goes to rail. Id. at 47. Because the majority of cities
have bus-only transit systems, spending figures for operating expenses are far more
relevant to the majority of transit systems. See id. at 23 (America has 2250 bus systems, as
opposed to 22 light rail, 16 commuter rail, and 14 heavy rail.), 69 (61% of transit users ride
buses).
374. See George Bush, Signing Statement, Pub. L. No. 101-336, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 601 (Act signed in July 1990).
375. See TRANSIT FACr BOOK, supra note 184, at 52 (government funding increased by
less than 1% between 1990 and 1996); 1999 ABSTRACr, supra note 2, at 495 (consumer
price index for all items increased by 20% between 1990 and 1996).
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376
that they be made equal to other transit-dependent Americans,
who in most of small-town and suburban America are also secondclass citizens. 377 If the federal government had followed similar
principles when it enacted civil rights laws addressing racial
discrimination, 378 it would have required that African-Americans be
treated identically to other then-despised minorities (for example,
homosexuals) rather than being treated identically to the white
majority-obviously an absurd result. A policy that would be absurd
when applied to African-Americans has been unsuccessful when

applied to disabled Americans:

some studies suggest that disabled

Americans are as poor today as they were in 1990. 379
B. Or Counterproductive?

If the ADA had merely allowed transit systems to eliminate bus
routes or avoid creating service where none existed, it would have
been at worst harmless. But in practice, the ADA actually gives
3 80
transit systems an incentive to reduce transit service for everyone.
As noted above, in the late 1990s the ADA cost transit
authorities about $1.4 billion a year 381-more than 1/3 of all federal

376. See Midgett v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist., 74 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1012 (D. Or.
1999) ("[Ihe ADA does not require public transit systems to provide better service to
disabled passengers than is provided to other passengers, only comparable service.").
377. See supra notes 24-47 and accompanying text (describing inadequacy of American
public transit).
378. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations
"on the ground of race, color, religion or national origin"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(prohibiting similar discrimination in employment context).
379. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (questioning whether status of
disabled has improved since 1990, and suggesting possible explanations for the absence of
progress).
380. See John J. Coleman & Marcel L. Debruge, A Practitioner'sIntroduction to ADA
Title II, 45 ALA. L. REV. 55, 105 (1993) (If cities cannot afford to expand transit service
for disabled to extent required by ADA, they face a choice between "either ignoring the
regulations ... or complying with the regulations in the only way that they can affordeliminating mass transit entirely.").
381. See Hynes-Cherin, supra note 11. About 3/4 of this sum was spent to satisfy the
ADA's paratransit requirements. See Doherty, supra note 11. It is unclear whether
Congress expected the ADA to cost this much: before the statute's passage, the
Congressional Budget Office estimated the costs of retrofitting buses and train stations to
make them more accessible to the disabled, but refused to estimate the costs of the ADA's
paratransit provisions. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 80-82 (1990) (stating that
"we cannot estimate the potential cost of the paratransit requirement" but estimating that
addition of wheelchair lifts to buses would cost $20-30 million per year, maintenance of
lift-equipped buses would cost $15 million per year, and modernization of rail facilities
would cost $1 billion over 20 years).
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transit subsidies for some years.38 But the federal government did
not help state and local governments pay the cost of the ADA's
mandates; instead, the federal government actually reduced transit

spending while it was dumping the costs of transporting the disabled
upon state and local transit systems. Between 1990 and 1996, the
federal government increased total transit spending by less than the

rate of inflation,383 and reduced operating subsidies by over 40%.384

By both reducing subsidies and imposing the ADA's costs on

transit agencies, the federal government took a huge bite out of
transit agencies' revenues. If $1.4 billion in ADA costs 385 are
subtracted from the total of federal transit grants, federal support for

transit was cut nearly in half, after adjusting spending totals for
inflation, between 1990 and 1999.386
And because federal spending cuts were targeted to operating
subsidies 387 (which disproportionately fund small-city, bus-only
transit 38 systems used primarily by the poor and the disabled) 389 as
382. See 1999 ABSTRACr, supra note 2, at 314 (In the late 1990s, federal grants to
transit systems ranged from $3.9 billion to $4.5 billion.).
383. See id at 314, 495 (Transit spending increased from $3.7 billion to $4.2 billion, or
15%, while consumer price index increased by 20%.).
384. See TRANSIT FACr BOOK, supra note 184, at 52. As noted above, operating
expenses are more important to most transit users than capital expenses, because capital
spending goes mostly to rail systems, and most cities lack rail of any sort. See id. at 37
(only 35.5% of capital grants went for bus-related projects), 119 and 121 (only 25 cities
have heavy or light rail service).
385. See Hynes-Cherin, supra note 11.
386. I calculate this figure as follows: federal transit grants, including both capital
subsidies and operating expense subsidies, increased in nominal terms from $3.7 billion to
$4.2 billion between 1990 and 1998. 1999 ABSTRACr, supra note 2, at 314. To reach the
"post-ADA" total, I subtract $1.4 billion in ADA-related costs (thus giving a federal
spending total of $2.8 billion, a 24% cut in nominal terms). See Hynes-Cherin, supra note
11 (estimating that ADA costs transit agencies $1.4 billion annually). I then factor in the
21% decrease in the dollar's value, 1999 ABSTRACr, supra note 2, at 493, for a grand total
of a 45% cutback.
387. See TRANSIT FACr BOOK, supra note 184, at 38 (federal and state governments
increased capital spending on transit between 1990 and 1996), 52 (federal government cut
operating subsidies by over 40%, before adjusting for inflation); CongressApproves $4.1
Billion for Transit in Fiscal Year '96, URBAN TRANSP. NEWS, Nov. 8, 1995, available at
1995 WL 8354546 ("new starts" capital grant program not cut at all, while operating
assistance cut by 44%) [hereinafter $4.1 Billion].
388. See TRANSIT FACr BOOK, supra note 184, at 37, 57 (only 35.5% of capital grants
used for bus projects, as opposed to 57.6% of operating expenses); Mid-Sized Transit
Agencies Hit Hardest by Federal Cuts, URBAN TRANSP. NEWS, Jan. 3, 1996, available at
1996 WL 8088255 (transit service cut most in mid-sized cities as opposed to larger cities,
because mid-sized cities more dependent on federal operating assistance); Urban Caucus
Opposes OperatingAssistance Phase-Out, URBAN TRANSP. NEWS, Jan. 7, 1994, available
at 1994 WL 2684899 ("[S]mall and mid-sized transit agencies... depend heavily on
[operating] assistance."); Lean with the Green, MASS TRANSrr, July 1, 1994, at 44
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opposed to capital spending (which primarily funds rail projects in a
few big cities),39° those cutbacks disproportionately affected the
transit-dependent poor and disabled.
Not surprisingly, most transit agencies raised fares and cut
service during the early and mid-1990s. In late 1995 and early 1996
alone, half of all American transit agencies raised fares, cut back
service, and laid off workers due to reductions in federal operating
assistance.

391

But transit service would have been reduced even if the federal
government had not reduced assistance to transit systems, because

the ADA essentially pitted disabled riders against other passengers.
In May 1995 (six months before the harshest federal budget cuts were
enacted), 392 a survey by the American Public Transit Association (a
transit system trade association) 393 revealed that 31% of transit
systems had reduced service, increased fares, or laid off employees to

meet the costs of ADA compliance, and 29% were considering doing
so.394 For example, in 1997 suburban Chicago's bus system, Pace,
increased paratransit services, but financed the increase by
eliminating eight bus routes and increasing paratransit fares by onethird.395
Other transit agencies eliminated or reduced fixed-route bus
service in order to avoid spending money on comparable paratransit
service. For example, Henrico County, Virginia reduced evening bus
service after the ADA was enacted, because it was not willing to

("[F]ederal operating aid takes up a relatively small share of expenses for transit systems
in large cities such as New York.").
389. See TRANSIT FACr BOOK, supra note 184, at 72-73 (transit users in smaller cities
more likely to be poor, female and disabled); Eric Mann, Radical Social Movements and
the Responsibility of ProgressiveIntellectuals, 32 LOYOLA L.A. L. REv. 761, 776 (1999)
(bus riders in Los Angeles disproportionately low-income and minority to greater extent
than subway riders).
390. See TRANSIT FACr BOOK, supra note 184, at 37 (capital spending targeted to
rail/non-bus projects), 23, 119, 121 (only a few large cities have rapid or light rail service).
391. See Fares Up, Service and Employment Down as Transit Budget Cuts Hit Home,
APTA Survey Finds, U.S. NEwSWIRE, May 6, 1996, availableat 1996 WL 5621136. The
cuts were approved by Congress in November 1995, which means that the service cuts and
fare increases took place over a period of only seven months. See $4.1 Billion, supra note
387.
392. In November 1995, Congress passed a budget that reduced operating assistance by
44%. Id.
393. See TRANSIT FACT BOOK, supra note 184, at 7.
394. See Costs of ParatransitService Higher than Government Admits, URBAN TRANSP.
NEWS, May 24,1995, availableat 1995 WL 8354463.
395. See Crimmins, supra note 12.

-
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spend $500,000 to provide evening service to paratransit users.396 In
such a situation, everybody loses: paratransit users get no more
service, and fixed-route riders get less.

If no disabled persons had been able to use public transit before
the ADA's enactment, it could be argued that the ADA benefited the

disabled by shifting resources from nondisabled transit users to
disabled transit users. But this was not the case. In fact, many
disabled Americans have always been able to use buses and trains
that do not fully comply with ADA standards: for example, blind
Americans could generally use fixed-route buses before the ADA
was enacted.397 By and large, the ADA's reforms were targeted
towards paratransit users 398 (who constitute a small minority of

disabled nondrivers) 399 and wheelchair users.4° Thus, the ADA, by
reducing service to the citizenry as a whole, actually reduced service

to those disabled persons who used public transit before its enactment
(that is, disabled persons other than wheelchair users).
Indeed, even paratransit users sometimes suffer from the ADA,
in two ways. First, as noted above, the ADA as written gives transit
systems a financial incentive to eliminate bus routes for everyone in
order to reduce its obligations to paratransit users. A transit system
need only provide paratransit service to persons living within 3/4 of a
0
if the system eliminates a bus route, it
mile of a bus or rail stop4°--so
also eliminates its obligation to serve disabled persons living near that
route. 4°2 In fact, some transit systems have eliminated bus routes for
396. See Marian Lumpkin, "Everybody Loses" in Bus Cuts, RICHMOND TIMESDISPATCH, Sept. 27, 1992, at B1. See also Swindell, supra note 368 (describing similar
reductions in Tulsa bus service).
397. See Orsi, supra note 13 (blind especially dependent on public transit even before
ADA's enactment).
398. See supra note 11 ($1.1 billion of $1.4 billion cost of ADA devoted to paratransit).
399. See Millar, supra note 2 (estimating that 24 million disabled Americans unable to
drive); Rennert, supra note 17, at 399 (only 1.4 million Americans unable to use fixedroute transit).
400. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. I, at 27 (1990) ("individuals who use wheelchairs
are specifically referenced" in ADA); iL at 58 (Section 222 of ADA "mandates
[wheelchair] lifts on every new public transit bus."); Tucker, supra note 9, at 931 (major
ADA-related change to fixed-route service is that "new buses and rail systems will have to
be fitted with lifts or ramps and fold-up seats or other wheelchair spaces with appropriate
securement devices"); Regulations Compliance Update, MASS TRANSIT, July 1, 1994, at 44
(Transit industry executives discussed ADA compliance, and consistently described their
major challenges as paratransit spending and making buses wheelchair-accessible.).
401. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.131(a)(1) and (a)(3).
402. See Judith Davidoff, Riders to Get Say on Bus Fares, Cuts, CAP. TIMES, May 6,
2000 ("Cutting an entire [bus] route can hire dire consequences not only for those who use
the fixed route service, but for partrausit riders as well: Service for people with disabilities
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that very purpose.4 3 Second, transit systems have been forced to
eliminate paratransit service for persons living outside the 3/4 mile
limit in order to finance other ADA requirements. For example, in
Lafayette, Indiana, the local bus system limited paratransit service to
persons living within the 3/4 mile limit in order to finance service for
40 4
persons living within that territorial limit.
The ADA's purpose was to increase transit service for the
disabled - but in fact the ADA has, by reducing transit agencies'
revenues, sometimes reduced transit service for the disabled.

IV. Solutions
The ADA, as interpreted by the courts, is fatally flawed because

instead of requiring that the disabled be given comparable
transportation to the auto-using majority, it requires only that the
disabled be given as much transportation as other transit-dependent
Americans 40 5-which is to say, not much. 40 6 This means that where,

as in most of America, transit-dependent Americans are an
impoverished minority, the transit-dependent disabled, too, are an

impoverished minority. It follows that if the disabled are to achieve
anything resembling equality of transportation opportunities, the
disabled must be given opportunities equal to those given to drivers.
This Part proposes a variety of transportation-related 4°7 reforms that,
if enacted, will move the disabled toward such equality.
is provided only within three-quarters of a mile from a mainline route."); Mark Eddington,
Route Plan May Strand DisabledRiders, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 25, 2000, at C1 (Possible
elimination of bus routes in suburban Salt Lake City might strand disabled individuals
living near areas served by routes.).
403. See Lumpkin, supra note 396 (describing service cuts near Richmond, Va.);
Swindell, supra note 368 (describing service cuts in Tulsa, Ok.); Trebor Banstetter, Palm
Tran Routes, SpecTran Cut in Jupiter, PALM BEACH POST, Apr. 21, 1999, at 1B
(describing service cuts in Jupiter, Fla.).
404. See Lori McClung, Losing Access: Compliance with Act Restricts Bus Line's
Service Area, J. & COURIER, Feb. 1, 1993, available at 1993 WL 3148300. Cf Scott
Powers, Board May Not Cut Its Bus Rides for the Disabled,COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept.
25,1996, at 4B (bus system in Columbus, Ohio, considered but rejected similar cutbacks).
405. See Hassan v. Slater, 41 F. Supp. 2d 343, 351 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 199 F.3d 1322 (2d
Cir. 1999) (elimination of train station did not violate ADA if it "affects all potential users,
not merely disabled users"); Midgett v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist., 74 F. Supp. 2d
1008, 1012 (D. Or. 1999) ("[The ADA does not require public transit systems to provide
better service to disabled passengers than is provided to other passengers, only
comparable service.").
406. See supra notes 25-47 and accompanying text (describing gaps in American transit
service).
407. In addition, a variety of other reforms in areas unrelated to transportation could
assist transit-dependent Americans by reversing the anti-urban/anti-transit policies
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No More Cutbacks

In Hassan, the court gave local governments free rein to cut
transit service without reducing services for drivers or violating the

ADA.408 As a result, the ADA may sometimes actually decrease the
mobility of the disabled, by giving local governments an incentive to
reduce all transit service in order to finance ADA-mandated

spending 4°9 or to avoid spending money on comparable paratransit

services for the most severely disabled. 410 Such attacks upon public

transit may technically comply with the ADA, but nevertheless are
destructive of the ADA's 41goal of making the disabled more
independent and employable. '

The logical solution to this gap in the ADA is to overrule Hassan
(either legislatively or judicially), 412 by prohibiting local governments
from reducing transit service or maintenance 413 in any way, or from
raising fares without raising drivers' costs in a similar manner (e.g., by
raising fuel taxes by the same amount as transit fares were raised).
discussed suprain notes 129-60, thus making it easier for all Americans to live and work in
transit-friendly areas. A full discussion of such "smart growth" reforms, however, is so
extensive as to be beyond the scope of this Article. Cf. Michael Lewyn, Suburban Sprawl:
Not Just an Environmental Issue Anymore, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 301, 371-82 (2000)
(proposing educational and tax reforms to make cities and older suburbs areas more
attractive to middle class); ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION (2000)
(proposing a variety of land use-related reforms to make suburbs and cities less autodependent).
408. See Hassan,43 F. Supp. at 351.
409. See supranotes 394 and accompanying text (By 1995, 60% of transit systems either
had reduced services, increased fares, or laid off employees to meet costs of ADA
compliance, or were considering doing so.); Crimmins, supra note 12 (example of service
reduction in order to meet costs of ADA compliance).
410. See Lumpkin, supra note 396 (example of service reduction calculated to reduce
paratransit expenses by reducing fixed-route transit service); Swindell, supra note 368
(same); Banstetter, supra note 403 (same).
411. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(8) ("[T]he Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with
disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency for such individuals."); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. I, at 24
(purposes of ADA are to "welcome individuals with disabilities fully into the mainstream
of American society" and to "make progress in providing much needed transit services for
individuals with disabilities").
412. A legislative solution is preferable because as a matter of law, Hassan may have
interpreted the ADA correctly. See supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text (suggesting
that Hassanconsistent with text of ADA).
413. I consider maintenance cutbacks to be de facto reductions of service, because such
policies effectively reduce the quantity of transit service a rider can purchase by making
buses unusable. See Midgett v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist., 74 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1010
(D. Or. 1999) (maintenance failures prevented disabled plaintiff from boarding buses);
Cupolo v. Bay Area Rapid Transit, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (inadequate
maintenance rendered trains unusable to disabled).
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Or to preserve governmental flexibility and avoid a direct conflict
with Hassan, a legislature or court could allow transit cutbacks only if
government reduced comparable services for drivers-for example,
by closing one road for every bus route eliminated, or by reducing
road funding by the same percentage as transit funding was reduced.
Because local governments would presumably be unwilling to close
roads414 or otherwise inconvenience drivers except during the gravest
fiscal crises, this statute would effectively bar the elimination of bus
routes.
A "no cutbacks" law would not only prevent reductions in
service, but also protect the settled expectations of the disabled and
other transit-dependent individuals: they could establish homes and
businesses near bus routes, and be secure in the knowledge that
government could not make their investments worthless by reducing
service. By contrast, today anyone who relies upon the existence of
public transportation services does so at his or her peril. 4 5 Moreover,
a "no cutbacks" law would be cheaper than mandating massive
increases in service, because it would require only that local
governments maintain existing levels of service.
It could be argued that a "no cutbacks" law would impair the
ability of governments to respond to fiscal crises. This argument lacks
merit, for two reasons. First, public transit spending comprises only
2% of state and local government spending. 416 Second, government
has grown so consistently over time 417 that spending reductions are
unlikely to be truly necessary under any circumstances short of an
emergency that could require cutbacks in highway service (e.g.,
reductions in highway maintenance spending) as well as transit
service. Thus, a "no cutbacks" statute would merely prevent public
414. Cf. Roads, supra note 91 (fifty largest metro areas added new road capacity during
1980s and 1990s, usually at greater rate than growth of regional population).
415. See Banstetter, supra note 403 (Resident of Jupiter, Fla. opposed elimination of
bus route because "My [visually impaired] wife and I deliberately chose our house because
it is close to the bus lines ... [t]his [route cut] will create tremendous difficulties for us.");
Davidoff, supra note 402 (quoting Madison, Wisconsin local officeholder's statement that
"if you take off a route, you could be stranding people who are very transit dependent");
Eddington, supra note 402 (Superintendent of state developmental center asserted that if
certain bus routes near Salt Lake City were eliminated, "about 100 people with disabilities
would lose their jobs and independence if those routes are lost.").
416. See 1999 ABSTRACr, supra note 2, at 317 (State and local governments spent $25
billion on public transit in 1996, and $1.3 trillion on all government services; thus, public
transit constituted 2% of state and local budgets.).
417. Id. at 316 (state and local government spending increased by nearly 220%, from
$307 billion to $982.6 billion, from 1980 to 1997), 495 (consumer price index increased by
less than 100% during same period).
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transit from being singled out for budget cuts rather than giving
transit a privileged position.
It could also be argued that a "no cutbacks" statute would
prevent transit systems from eliminating "inefficient" routes with low

ridership. This argument is essentially a variant of the common antitransit argument that public transit does not "pay for itself" 418-an
argument that proves too much. Few if any government services pay

for themselves in the sense of being paid for by users: for example,
no trust fund supports food stamps or other social welfare programs,
419
and highway spending is supported partially by general revenues.

So a policy based solely on such a narrow definition of "efficiency"
narrowly defined would require the elimination of most government
services.

Admittedly, a "no cutbacks" law would not require actual
expansion of public transit, nor would it narrow the gap between the
transit-dependent disabled and auto users - but at least it would
prevent local government from widening that gap.
B. No Roads Without Transit

State and local governments do not reduce transit service solely
by eliminating bus routes or reducing hours of service: they also
reduce opportunities for the transit-dependent by the more politically
popular 420 technique of building and widening roads. As noted
above, 421 suburban road expansions often reduce opportunities for
transit-dependent individuals (including the transit-dependent
disabled) by encouraging individuals and their employers to move to
areas with little or no public transit.

418. See Al Lembke, Rail Failures, PRESS DEMOCRAT, June 7, 1997, at B7 (criticizing
proposed light rail system because "[n]o public transportation system pays for itself
through fares.... The only people who benefit from such an undertaking are the
contractors and politicians who get kickbacks").
419. See 1999 ABSTRACF, supra note 2, at 635 (government at all levels spent $92
billion on highways, but received only $59 billion in fuel taxes). Moreover, government
arguably subsidizes drivers by financing a variety of auto-related costs other than highways
from general revenues. See F. Kaid Benfield, Running on Empty: The Case for a
Sustainable National TransportationSystem, 25 ENVTL. L. 651, 654 (1995) (According to

study by Natural Resources Defense Council, "[a]utomobiles received a much higher
aggregate subsidy than does bus or rail transport" because drivers do not pay social costs
such as "congestion, subsidized parking, accidents, noise, building damage, and air and
water pollution."); Lewyn, supra note 93, at 541-42.
420. See 1999 ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 314, 635 (highway funding consistently
increased in 1980s and 1990s).
421. See supranotes 85-102, and accompanying text.
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The only way to prevent such "stealth cutbacks" is a "No Roads
Without Transit" (NRWT) law that would condition all road
expansions in metropolitan areas upon transit improvements to
4
commercial areas served by (and thus likely to develop because of)
road improvements.
Specifically, a state or federal law could provide that any new or
widened roads be accompanied by significant transit service to the
road itself (if the road was a commercial street accessible to
pedestrians) or to commercial streets near highway exits (if the road
was a limited-access highway). 423
The major advantage of NRWT is that it would not increase
government spending by one cent: if governments did not want to
spend money on transit, they would not have to spend money on
roads. Indeed, drivers might be better off, because if local
governments were unwilling to throw money either at roads or at
transit, they might reduce transportation spending and reduce the
gasoline taxes that traditionally finance a large portion of such
spending. 424 NRWT merely applies the principles of the ADA to
highway spending:
just as the ADA apparently gives local
governments the choice between providing public transit to the
disabled and providing public transit to no one,425 NRWT would give
local governments the choice between improving transportation for
the transit-dependent (including the transit-dependent disabled) and
improving transportation for no one.
C. More Radical Remedies

A "no cutbacks" law, together with a NRWT law, would prevent
governments from using transportation policy to widen the gap
between the transit-dependent disabled and drivers. But neither
proposal would remove or even narrow inequities caused by past
policies. To remedy the harm caused by the policies of the past
century, government would actually have to improve transit service
422. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (noting that suburban highways shift
commercial as well as residential development to suburbs).
423. Because the primary purpose of such a law would be to ferry transit users to jobs
and recreational opportunities in the suburbs, the NWRT law would require service only
to streets containing such amenities, and would require service for as long as such
opportunities were open (e.g., until most or all merchants on the street closed at night).
424. See 1999 ABSTRACr, supra note 2, at 635 (over 60% of highway spending financed
by fuel taxes).
425. See Midgett v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist., 74 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1012 (D. Or.
1999) ("[T]he ADA does not require public transit systems to provide better service to
disabled passengers than is provided to other passengers, only comparable service.").
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rather than merely refusing to further degrade public transit. Ideally,
state and local governments would be required to make most or all
jobs transit-accessible.
Such a "universal transit access" law would, despite its cost,
merely extend existing ADA principles. The ADA as written already
provides that no covered employer (that is, employer with over 15
employees) 426 may discriminate against the disabled, 427 and that a
qualified individual is one who "with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
Thus, employers have a duty to
employment position." 428
"reasonably accommodate" disabled employees under the ADA 429
unless such an accommodation would create "undue hardship." 430
For example, an employer in an area with no evening bus service
might be required to allow a disabled employee to work an earlier
shift so that the employee could finish work in time to use a bus 431 but only if such an accommodation would be "reasonable" enough
not to create "undue hardship." This principle could be extended to
require that employers fail to reasonably accommodate disabled
employees as a class if they locate in areas without public transit.
Because mandatory relocation would arguably constitute "undue
hardship" such a requirement should not be imposed by judicial fiat.
Instead, a "universal transit access" law could require that every
urban or suburban4 32 employer covered by the ADA (that is, every
employer employing 15 persons or more) 433 be reachable by regular
bus or train service. For example, the statute could provide: "All
employers which are located within a metropolitan area and which
employ over 15 persons must be accessible by fixed-route transit

426. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(a).
427. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (No covered employer "shall discriminate against a qualified
individual because... of the disability of such individual.").
428. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
429. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (Discrimination means "not making reasonable
accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability.").
430. Id. See also Jeffrey Van Detta, "Typhoid Mary" Meets the ADA: A Case Study of
the "Direct Threat" Standard Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 22 HARV. J. LAW
& PUB. POL'Y 849,867 & nn.75-78 (1999) (discussing factors relevant to "undue hardship"
inquiry).
431. See Patterson v. Meijier, 897 F. Supp. 1002,1007 (W.D. Mich. 1995).
432. Presumably, such a statute would contain an exemption for rural employers;
suburban employers could employ transit-dependent individuals from central cities, but
rural employers by definition have no central city to recruit anyone from.
433. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) ("[T]he term 'employer' means a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees.").
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service. Such service must run at least once an hour until after the
closing of the employer's business." This statute arguably would not
require a significant number of employers to relocate, because many
suburban governments might, in order to receive sales and property
tax revenue from employers, be willing to invest in bus service in
434
order to retain suburban employers.

Such a statute would benefit millions of people: a 1998 Harris
survey revealed that 30% of disabled Americans surveyed (and 17%
of nondisabled individuals) 435 identified inadequate transportation as
a problem. Admittedly, a "universal transit access" statute would by
no means grant the transit-dependent disabled full equality with
drivers, because some individuals would no doubt have to take
multiple buses (that is, take bus A, then transfer to bus B to reach
suburban employer C) to reach suburban employers. But at least the
disabled would be entitled to something they now lack: a guaranteed
minimal level of transit service to suburban employers.
The most persuasive objection to such a proposal would be
cost-and certainly the costs of such a bold proposal would require
further study. However, there is some reason to believe that state
and local governments could afford to comply with a universal transit
access statute. According to a researcher at the American Public
Transit Association, hourly bus service to every employer with over

15 employees would cost only $1 billion 436 -less than 1% of total
government transportation spending437 and less than 0.1% of all state

434. See BENFIELD ET AL., supra note 34, at 112-13 ("There is a common belief among
local governments that, contrary to the situation with respect to residential
neighborhoods, the revenues generated from commercial land uses have only positive
fiscal benefits and may be used to offset the high costs of providing public services to
As a result, many local governments still aggressively seek
residential developments ....
commercial and industrial developments.").
435. See Thomas P. Wyman, Disabled Fight to Keep IndyGo Service, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Dec. 14,1998, at Al.
436. See Correspondence with Terry Bronson, Aug. 20, 1998 (on file with author).
Ironically, the researcher opposed universal transit access on the ground that even $1
billion was too much because of the likely low ridership. I disagree, because I believe
there may be a significant untapped potential demand for public transit. Only 5.3% of
Americans use public transit to commute to work, 1999 ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 641,
but 9% of households lack a vehicle, id. at 643, and many auto-owning households
(including every such household with a child under 16) presumably include at least one
nondriver. Specifically, there are 182 million persons over 16, but only 163 million
licensed drivers. Id. Thus, 19 million adults have no drivers' license-a number that
exceeds the number of carless households by 10 million. In addition, the 54 million
Americans under age 16 presumably do not drive. Id.
437. See 1999 ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 635 ($101 billion spent on highways alone).
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and local government spending.438 It follows that even if bus service
was required every quarter hour, the total cost might be as low as $4
439
billion-less than 4% of total government transportation spending
and less than 0.4% of total state and local government spending. 440 If
these estimates are correct (admittedly a huge if) the costs of
universal transit access would certainly be low enough to justify a
universal transit access law. Alternatively, if universal transit access
risked imposing heavy costs on existing employers or on local
governments, a state or federal government could grandfather
existing businesses by requiring only that new businesses be transitaccessible.
It could also be argued that an employer's duty to accommodate
individual disabled employees (for example, by allowing them to
finish work before bus service stops running) would render universal
transit access unnecessary. 441 This argument is meritless for two
reasons. First, some employers have no offices served by any public
transportation, and thus could not reasonably accommodate transitdependent employees. Second, disabled job applicants might be
unable to avail themselves of such a reasonable accommodation,
either because of ignorance of their legal rights or inability to even
reach a workplace for a job interview.
D. ParatransitOnly: A Reform That Won't Work

It could be argued that the reforms above are unnecessary,
because an expanded paratransit system alone could handle the needs
of the disabled. The logic behind this argument is that traditional
fixed-route systems waste billions on mostly-empty buses rather than
targeting service to the disabled who need transit the most.442
This argument lacks merit for three reasons. First, paratransit is
arguably even less cost-effective than fixed-route service. 443 Nearly
438. Id. at 1319 (State and local government spending exceeds $1.3 trillion.).
439. See supranote 437 and accompanying text.
440. See supra note 438 and accompanying text.
441. See Patterson v. Meijier, 897 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (W.D. Mich. 1995) (such an
accommodation reasonable).
442. See, e.g., Jerry Heaster, Mass Transit: Just the Ticket to Waste Taxes, KANSAS CITY
STAR, June 9, 2000, at C1 (Instead of investing in buses and trains for everyone, society
should "subsidize transportation assistance for the economically disadvantaged, the
disabled or the elderly unable to get around on their own. This sort of taxpayer help,
however, would be focused narrowly on the need of those for whom help is crucial to their
well-being.").
443. See Rennert, supra note 17, at 362 ("Paratransit is so costly that it can meet only a
small fraction of the transportation needs of disabled riders."); id. at 395-97 (citing DOT
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80% of disabled persons who use public transportation rely on fixed-

route buses rather than paratransit,444 less than 5% of all transitdependent disabled individuals are physically incapable of using
fixed-route service, 445 and less than 2% of all transit trips involve any
form of demand-response transportation (including but not limited to
paratransit). 446 Yet paratransit engulfs about 3/4 of all ADA-related
spending.447
Second, paratransit, despite its high cost, need not serve all

disabled Americans under existing law: as noted above, the ADA
requires local governments to finance paratransit service not for all
disabled Americans, but only for riders who, for one reason or

another, are unable to use fixed-route transit to reach their
destinations. 448 Moreover, paratransit users are subject to a variety of
other limitations that make paratransit less effective than fixed-route
service. For example:
* Paratransit users often must make reservations 24 hours in
advance to use paratransit, 449 instead of receiving service on demand.
As the House Education and Labor Committee found at the time of
the ADA's enactment, this limitation "often conflicts with one's work
schedule or interests in going out to restaurants and the like." 450
Because the demand for service exceeds the amount of service

cost projections supporting this view and explaining that DOT actually overestimated
usefulness of paratransit by counting only wheelchair users as disabled fixed-route users
but counting all passengers as paratransit riders); Lynette Petty, Section 504
TransportationRegulations: Molding Civil Rights Laws to Meet the Realities of Economic
Constraints, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 558, 600 (1987) ("Paratransit systems are the most
expensive to operate ....An accessible bus system appears to be the most cost-effective
approach for small cities.").
444. Cheryl Little, Disabledin Action, ENVTL. ACrION, Mar. 22,1996, at 27.
445. See Millar, supra note 2 (24 million disabled Americans unable to drive); Rennert,
supra note 17, at 399 (1.4 million Americans too severely disabled to use fixed-route
buses).
446. See TRANSIT FACT BOOK, supra note 184, at 110-123 (On an average weekday
Americans take 341,000 demand-response trips, as opposed to over 24 million bus and
train trips.).
447. See Hynes-Cherin supra note 11 (ADA cost transit operators $1.4 billion per year);
Doherty, supra note 11 (paratransit provisions of ADA cost transit operators $1.1 billion
per year).
448. See 42 U.S.C. § 12143(c)(1) (Paratransit services must be provided to disabled
individuals who are unable to board buses or trains without assistance, cannot travel to
bus or train stop, or wish to travel at a time when only buses or trains available are
inaccessible to the disabled.).
449. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.131(b).
450. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. I, at 38 (1990).
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available, there is often a waiting list for paratransit service;
moreover, rides are often delayed. 451
* DOT regulations require only that reservation service must be
available only during normal business hours (as opposed to evenings
and weekends). 452 So a rider cannot schedule a ride if he learns of his
needs the evening before a possible trip.
* Just as paratransit is more expensive for state and local
governments, it is also more expensive to riders: under DOT
fares may be twice the fixed-route fare for a
regulations, paratransit
45 3
ride.
comparable
* Reductions in fixed-route service might lead to reductions in
paratransit service, because under current law paratransit need not
serve anyone who lives more than 3/4 mile from a bus or train stop. 454
boundaries
* Paratransit service need not cross jurisdictional
455
stop.
bus
a
of
mile
3/4
within
living
even for persons
To be sure, all of these problems could be solved by changes in
the law: transit systems could be required to serve paratransit users
on demand no matter where they lived, and all disabled Americans
could be made eligible for paratransit service. But such innovations
would cause the cost of paratransit to balloon-and some of the same
commentators who now complain about the alleged cost and
inefficiency of fixed-route service would no doubt complain about the
cost and inefficiency of paratransit service. Finally, fixed-route
service has advantages that paratransit lacks. Because the general
public uses fixed-route buses and trains, such service not only aids the
disabled, but aids other public goals, such as the public interest in
helping the carless poor reach jobs, 456 the public interest in reducing

451. See Kate Miller, DisabledRiders Rely on UnreliableService, TENNESSEEAN, July
5,2000, at 1B (In Nashville, "[a]t times the waiting list for rides has topped 400 .... Delays
and changes in pickup times remain troubling. For a disabled person dependent on public
transportation, these minutes can be the difference between having and not having a job,
getting or not getting a degree and making or missing doctor appointments."); Alfonso R.
Castillo, The Ride Stuff: Disabled Want Better Bus Service, NEWSDAY, Mar. 18, 2000, at
A37 (In Suffolk County, New York, paratransit riders "must call a week in advance if they
expect to get an appointed time near the one they want... once the appointment is made,
the buses rarely show up on time.").
452. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.131(b).

453. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.131(c).
454. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.131(a)(1).
455. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.131(a)(3).
456. See Heaster, supra note 442 (transit critic admits that public spending necessary to
assist transit-dependent poor); Simmons, supra note 2, at 260 (94% of welfare recipients
lack cars).
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traffic congestion by taking cars off the road,457 and the public interest
in reducing auto-induced air pollution.458 So even if fixed-route buses
are more expensive than paratransit, they also create benefits that
paratransit service targeted to the disabled does not create.
In sum, a paratransit-only strategy is no substitute for expanded
fixed-route service-both because the limited paratransit service
required by the ADA does not serve the disabled as effectively as
fixed-route service, and because the paratransit expansion necessary
to make paratransit a worthy substitute for fixed-route service might
be just as expensive and less socially useful than existing fixed-route
service.
Conclusion
For nearly a century, government at all levels has, through a
variety of policies, immobilized transit-dependent Americans
(including many disabled Americans). The ADA attempted to
remedy this wrong by requiring that the disabled receive as much
public transportation as anyone else-a solution that has proven to be
unworkable because thanks to the anti-transit policies of the past,
many jobs and other opportunities are now inaccessible by public
transit. It follows that if America wishes to give the disabled full
mobility, it must make the disabled equal not only to other transit
users but to drivers, by prohibiting government from expanding
highway service without expanding transit service, by prohibiting
further cutbacks in transit service, and by increasing transit service to
existing job sites.

457. See Miller Tours, Inc. v. Vanderhoof, 13 F. Supp. 2d 501, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(State aids mass transit "as a means of reducing energy demands, traffic congestion, and
air pollution.").
458. Id.

